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The Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery: A
Plea for Reasonable Limitations
Steven P. Grossman*
I. Introduction
In reinstating the Iowa murder conviction of Robert Williams,
the Supreme Court accepted explicitly for the first time the doctrine
of inevitable discovery. Applied for some time by state' and federal
courts, 2 the doctrine of inevitable discovery is a means by which evidence obtained illegally can still be admitted against defendants in
criminal cases. Unfortunately, the Court chose to adopt the doctrine
without any of the safeguards necessary to insure that the deterrent
* The author, a former prosecutor in New York City, is currently Professor of Law,
University of Baltimore Law School. B.A. City College of New York 1969, J.D. Brooklyn Law
School 1973, LL.M. New York University Law School 1977.
I. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 120 Ariz. 229, 231, 585 P.2d 249, 251 (Ct. App.
1978) (reciting but not applying inevitable discovery); State v. Tillery, 107 Ariz. 34, 39, 481
P.2d 271, 276 (1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 847 (1971); People v. Emanuel, 87 Cal.
App. 3d 205, 214, 151 Cal. Rptr. 44, 50 (1978); Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d
166, 170, 474 P.2d 683, 686, 89 Cal. Rptr. 731, 734 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 910
(1971); Sheff v. State, 301 So.2d 13, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), aff'd on other grounds,
329 So.2d 270 (1976); People v. Pearson, 67 III. App. 3d 300, 308-10, 384 N.E.2d 1331, 133738 (1978); People v. Moore, 55 III. App. 3d 706, 711-12, 371 N.E.2d 194, 197-98 (1977), affd
on other grounds, 61 III. App. 3d 694, 378 N.E.2d 516 (1978); Leuschner v. State, 41 Md.
App. 423, 428, 397 A.2d 622, 626 (1979); People v. Tucker, 19 Mich. App. 320, 328-30, 172
N.W.2d 712, 717-18 (1969), affd, 385 Mich. 594, 189 N.W.2d 290 (1971), acq. in result,
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 313-14, 380
N.E.2d 224, 230-31, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 401-02 (1978), forma pauperis granted and probable
jurisdiction noted, 439 U.S. 1044 (1978); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 506-08, 300
N.E.2d 139, 141-42, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); State v. McKendall, 36 Or. App.
187, 192, 584 P.2d 316, 320 (1978) (applying inevitable discovery test codified in OR. REV.
STAT. § 133.683 (1977); Commonwealth v. Wideman, 478 Pa. 102, 105, 385 A.2d 1334, 1336
(1978); Ex parte Parker, 485 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tex. Crim. 1972). See also, People v. Kusowski, 403 Mich. 653, 662, 272 N.W.2d 503, 506 (1978) (separate opinion); Annotation, Fruit of
the Poisonous Tree Doctrine Excluding Evidence Dervied from Information Gained in Illegal
Search, 43 A.L.R.3d 385, 404-06 (1972); cf. State v. Sickels, 275 N.W.2d 809, 814 (Minn.
1979).
2. United States v. Fisher, 700 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Apker,
705 F.2d 293, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir.
1982); United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1358 (11 th Cir. 1982); Papp v. Jago, 656 F.2d
221, 222 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910, 914 (Ist Cir. 1980);
United States v. Brooking, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042-44 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Schmidt,
573 F.2d 1065-66, n.9 (9th Cir. 1978); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914,
927-28 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); United States ex rel Owens v.
Twomey, 508 F.2d 858, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051,
1053 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 (1970); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d
205, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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impact of the exclusionary rule would be preserved, and in a form
that is subject to and almost invites abuse.
This article warns of the danger to fundamental constitutional
protections posed by the open-ended approach taken by the Supreme
Court to the doctrine of inevitable discovery in Nix v. Williams
(Williams JJ). a It then recommends a means of applying the doctrine so as to accomplish its purpose of avoiding unwarranted exclusion of probative evidence without significantly diluting the impact
of the exclusionary rule.
Brewer v. Williams"

II.

The disappearance of ten-year old Pamela Powers from the
YMCA building in Des Moines, Iowa on Christmas Eve, 1968 set
off a chain of events which culminated in two major and highly controversial Supreme Court decisions separated in time by seven years.
In order to comprehend the rationale and approach of the Supreme
Court to the doctrine of inevitable discovery, it is first necessary to
summarize the known facts surrounding the death of Pamela
Powers.
A short time after Pamela Powers' disappearance, Robert Williams, an escaped mental patient residing at the YMCA, asked a 14
year old boy to help him load a large bundle wrapped in a blanket
into his car. The boy later reported that extending from the bundle
he had seen two legs that were "skinny and white." The next day
Robert Williams' car was located in Davenport, a city 160 miles east
of Des Moines. Shortly thereafter, articles of clothing which the police believed belonged to Pamela Powers and an army blanket, similar in appearance to the one used to wrap the bundle Williams had
removed from the YMCA, were found at a rest stop on Interstate
80, approximately 60 miles east of Des Moines. These facts led police to suspect that Williams had murdered the Powers girl and disposed of her body somewhere between Des Moines and and the rest
stop where the articles of clothing and the blanket were found. The
police then obtained an arrest warrant for Robert Williams and began a large scale search for the child's body in the vicinity of the rest
stop.,
On December 26th, while this search was underway, Williams,
after speaking with an attorney, surrendered himself to the police in
3.
4.

467 U.S. 431 (1984).
430 U.S. 387 (1977) (hereinafter Williams 1).

5. 467 U.S. at 434-35.
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Davenport. He was given his Miranda rights, charged with murder
and arraigned before a judge. Arrangements were then made to
transport Williams, accompanied by two detectives, back to Des
Moines by car. An agreement was reached between the police and
Williams' attorneys that no questioning of Williams would occur
during the ride. Both Williams and Detective Leaming, who was to
accompany him, were made aware of this agreement. 6 On the car
ride back to Des Moines, however, Detective Learning delivered the
now famous "Christian burial speech" to Williams, in which he told
Williams of the need to locate the child's body before the Iowa winter snows covered it up and prevented the girl from getting a proper
Christian burial. 7 After some more discussion between the two, Williams eventually led Learning to the site of the child's body.
Based largely on the above facts, Williams was convicted of
murder in the first degree for the death of Pamela Powers. After his
appeal was rejected by the Iowa Supreme Court,8 Williams sought
Habeas Corpus relief in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa.' The District Court reversed his conviction, and this decision was affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit."° The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the Eighth Circuit and ordered that Williams be retried
(Williams I)." The Court found that the statement that Detective
Learning had obtained from Williams during the ride from Davenport to Des Moines violated Williams' right to counsel under the
sixth amendment. Because Williams had been arraigned, the formal
judicial process had already commenced, and he was fully protected
by the sixth amendment. The Court determined that the speech
Learning made to Williams was a deliberate elicitation of information from Williams and therefore a violation of Williams' right to
6. Id. at 435-36.
7. Detective Learning reportedly said the following to Williams:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the
road . . . They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that
you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is ...
and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And
since we will be going right past the area [where the body is] on the way into
Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of
this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was
snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered . ...
id. at 435.
8. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1970).
9. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
10. Brewer v. Williams, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1974).
II. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (Williams I).
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counsel1 2 under the holding in Massiah v. United States."3
Readers of this opinion could not help but be drawn to two
other parts of the Supreme Court's decision. One was a particularly
bitter dissent by the Chief Justice beginning with: "The result in this
case ought to be intolerable in any society which purports to call
itself an organized society.""' It was this same Chief Justice who
would later author the opinion in Williams H that, in the end,
avoided this "intolerable result" by applying the doctrine of inevitable discovery. The second item of note in Williams I, not related
directly to the sixth amendment issue at hand, was the hint contained in the footnote at the conclusion of the Court's opinion given
to those who would ultimately determine the judicial fate of Robert
Williams:
[Wihile neither Williams' incriminating statements themselves
nor any testimony describing his having led the police to the
victim's body can constitutionally be admitted into evidence, evidence of where the body was found and of its condition might
well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been
discovered in any event, even had incriminating statements not
been cited from Williams.15
It was in fact the doctrine of inevitable discovery, alluded to in this
footnote, which became the vehicle through which evidence obtained
from the victim's body was admitted against Williams in his second
trial.
III.

Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

In order to assess the worthiness of the doctrine of inevitable
discovery and to understand the parameters within which it should
operate, the doctrine needs to be analyzed in its proper context. Such
an analysis necessarily includes a discussion of the purposes of the
Exclusionary Rule, the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine and the
exceptions to this doctrine, among which is the doctrine of inevitable
discovery.
The rule which excludes illegally obtained evidence from use by
the prosecution in a criminal case has traditionally been justified in
two ways. First, it is argued that the use of evidence obtained in
12. Id. at 399. Additionally, the Court ruled that although Williams may have understood his right to counsel, the state was unable to demonstrate that he relinquished that right.
Id. at 404-05.

13. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
14.
15.

430 U.S. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 407 n.12.
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violation of the law by courts charged with enforcing that law would
threaten the integrity of the judicial system itself.16 This concept,
known as the principle of judicial integrity, has been viewed with
increasing disfavor by the Supreme Court in recent years.", Instead,
it is the purported deterrent impact upon the police produced by suppressing illegally obtained evidence that is cited most often today as
the justification of the exclusionary rule.1 8 This deterrent impact is
intended not only for the offending officer, but for all officers who in
the future might consider engaging in the same improper conduct.' 9
Bearing in mind that deterrence is currently perceived to be the primary justification behind the exclusionary rule, it is important now
to assess the extent to which the exclusionary rule is applied.
The exclusionary rule has been applied by the Supreme Court
to what has been called secondary or derivative evidence as well as
primary evidence." This means that whether the illegal conduct of
the police officer leads directly or indirectly to the discovery of evidence, that evidence will be suppressed providing there is a causal
link between the original illegality and the evidence sought to be
used. 2 For example: A is illegally arrested, confesses following this
16. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). After noting "the imperative of
judicial integrity" which emerged from Elkins, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659
(1961), wrote: "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence." Id. at 659.
17. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (wherein the Court, quoting in
part from United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) states: "The Court, however,
has established that the 'prime purpose' of the rule, if not the sole one, is to deter future
unlawful police conduct." See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), wherein the Court
went even further in minimizing the significance of the principle of judicial integrity: "While
courts of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process,
this concern has a limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence." Id. at 485.
18. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. at
446; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 486; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347.
19. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 446; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 484; Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 710 (1970).
That the exclusionary rule looks to future police misconduct was explained by the Court in
Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The Elkins Court emphasized that: "The rule is calculated to prevent not to repair. Its purpose is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effective available way - by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id.
at 217. See also, 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 653-54 (1978) [hereinafter LaFave];
Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875, 882 (1982);
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the 50 States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 355 (1962).
20. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
21. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484; Nardone, 308 U.S. at 340; Silverthorne, 251 U.S.
at 392; LaCount & Girese, The Inevitable Discovery Rule: An Evolving Exception to the
Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 ALB. L. REV. 483, 506-09 (1976). See generally 3
LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 11.4, at 612. The reason for the application of the exclusionary rule
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illegal arrest and implicates B as the source of his narcotics. If the
police enter B's house, seize the narcotics and ultimately use them in
a prosecution against A, the narcotics will be suppressed due to the
fact that their discovery stems from the original illegality committed
against A. Such derivative or secondary evidence has been called the
"fruit of the poisonous tree." 22 The exclusion of such illegally obtained or derivative evidence will result whether the evidence stems
from an illegal search or seizure under the fourth amendment 23 or a
statement taken in violation of the defendant's right under either the
fifth or sixth amendment.2 4
Because the exclusionary rule operates to prevent the prosecution from using probative evidence against defendants in criminal
cases, and the perception among many that guilty people often go
free because of this exclusion, 5 the exclusionary rule has been the
subject of much criticism.2 In an effort to ameliorate both the actual and the perceived impact of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme
Court has limited its application. Specifically, where the Court has
determined that the deterrent impact upon the police of applying the
exclusionary rule in a specific situation is minimal, the Court has

been reluctant to apply the rule.2 When the evidence at issue is deto secondary as well as primary evidence is that, "to forbid the direct use of methods ... but
to put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty' " Nardone, 308 U.S. at 340.
22. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341. This "hypothetical" is actually borrowed from the facts
of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
23. Id. See also, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
24. See 4 LAFAVE. SEARCH & SEIZURE 371 (1978), and cases cited therein. The derivative evidence rule has been applied at times to evidence derived from non-constitutional violations as well. Id.
25. See National Institute of Justice, The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in
California 10 (1982), which purports to demonstrate empirically the significant impact of the
Exclusionary Rule. But see Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions, (Report of the Comptroller General, 4/19/79); Nardulli, Social Costs of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.585 (1983); Davies, A Hard Look
at What We Know About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611
(1983); Fyfe, Enforcement Workshop: The NiJ Study of the Exclusionary Rule, 19 CRIM. L.
BULL. 253 (1983).
26. Beginning with Judge Cardozo's often quoted assessment of the exclusionary rule:
"The criminal goes free because the constable has blundered," People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13,
23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587-88 (1926), the debate on the rule has been "more remarkable for its
volume than its cogency." Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for
Wolf, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. I, 33 (1961). See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); SCHLESINGER. EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE
(1977); Miles, Decline of the Fourth Amendment: Time to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 27 CATH.
U.L. REV. 9 (1977); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUD.
214 (1978); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents' Proven That it is a Deterrent to Police, 62 JUD. 404 (1979).
27. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 453-54 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-95 (1976); United States v. Calandra,
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rivative, the Court has been particularly sensitive to the concern that
the cost to society of applying the exclusionary rule exceeds the benefit achieved by the deterrent impact of the rule.28 As a result, the
Court has fashioned several exceptions to the principle that evidence
which is the "fruit of a poisonous tree" must be excluded.
In 1920, the Court created the independent source exception to
the exclusionary rule."9 Stated simply, the independent source exception provides that when the discovery of information or evidence is
achieved both by illegal means and through an independent legal
source, the evidence will not be suppressed."0 This exception, according to the current Supreme Court, stems from the principle that the
police should not be put in a worse position than they would have
been in had they not committed the illegality."' For example, in a
situation where narcotics are seized after the police learn of their
location both through information obtained from an illegal statement
by a defendant and through information learned from a witness
whom they discovered legally, disallowing the use of that narcotics
at trial would be putting the police in a worse position than they
would have been in had they not obtained the illegal statement from
the defendant.
Nineteen years after outlining the independent source exception
in Silverthorne v. United States,3 2 the Court identified another situation where the exclusionary rule should not be applied to derivative
evidence. In Nardone v. United States,a3 the Court held that evidence may be admissible even where the discovery is linked exclusively to a police illegality. The Court, in Nardone, concluded that
414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).
28. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106-10 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. 268, 279-80 (1978): Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). In determining that the defendant's confession was a
"fruit" of his "poisonous tree" illegal arrest, the Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 60304 (1975), reiterated that the existence of a causal connection between the illegality and the
derivative evidence was not enough by itself to warrant exclusion. Instead a matrix of factors
would have to be employed on a case by case basis to see if application of the exclusionary rule
was justified.
29. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
30. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485 (quoting Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392). The justification for the independent source exception was stated in Sutton v. United States, 267 F.2d 271
(4th Cir. 1959) as follows:
It is one thing to say that officers shall gain no advantage from violating the
individual's rights; it is quite another to declare that such a violation shall put
him beyond the law's reach even if his guilt can be proved by evidence that has
been obtained lawfully.
Id. at 272.
31. Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) [hereinafter Williams II].
32. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
33. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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where the discovery of evidence occurs under circumstances that
suggest that the effect of the original illegality has become "attenuated" or weakened, the causal chain between the illegality and the
discovery of the evidence may be deemed to have been broken.34 In
such situations the evidence would no longer be considered "tainted"
and would therefore be admissible against the defendant.
The Court had an opportunity to explain the application of this
attenuation doctrine in 1968 in the case of Wong Sun v. United
States."5 In Wong Sun the Supreme Court held that although verbal
evidence can be the fruit of a poisonous tree and therefore suppressible, suppression will not result automatically, even when a causal
connection can be shown to exist between the original illegality and
the discovered evidence.36 Expressed differently, the Court determined that merely because the evidence in question would not have
been discovered "but for" the illegality does not mean exclusion will
automatically result. Instead, courts should look to "whether granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection has been made has been come at by exploitation of
that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the premium taint."37
Following his illegal arrest, Wong Sun made a statement to the
police that he sought to have suppressed as a product of his illegal
arrest. The Court noted that because Wong Sun had been freed after
arraignment and had returned voluntarily several days later to make
his statement, "the connection between the arrest and statement 'had
become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' "38 Specifically,
Wong Sun's several days of freedom after his illegal arrest and other
events preceding his giving of the statement to the police had so
weakened the lingering effects of his illegal arrest that it was unreasonable to say that the confession resulted from an exploitation of
the illegal arrest.3 9
The third exception to the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine
has been applied by some state and federal courts for years but was
never explicitly accepted by the Supreme Court until its 1984 decision in Nix v. Williams (Williams II).'0 Known as the doctrine of
34. Id. at 341.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Id. at 487-78.
Id. at 488 (quoting from MAGUIRE. EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).
371 U.S. at 491.
Id.
467 U.S. 431 (1984).
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inevitable discovery, this exception allows for the admission of evidence whose discovery derives from a police illegality, but which the
police can show would likely have been discovered eventually by legitimate means." Therefore, although the challenged evidence is
linked causally to an illegality and no attenuation has occurred, the
police are given the opportunity to demonstrate hypothetically that
the evidence would have been discovered by some legal means in the
future had the illegality not occurred. In order to understand and
assess the doctrine of inevitable discovery as outlined by the Supreme Court in Williams II, it is necessary to pick up the story of
Robert Williams after the Supreme Court reversed his conviction in
1977.
IV. Supreme Court Acceptance of the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine (Williams II)42
At Williams' second murder trial in 1977, the prosecution introduced evidence obtained from the body of Pamela Powers which was
located as a direct result of the illegal statement obtained from Williams by Detective Leaming.43 The theory behind the trial court's
decision to admit this evidence was that the body would have been
discovered ultimately by a police search which was well in progress
at the time Detective Learning obtained his statement from Williams;" in other words, the doctrine of inevitable discovery. In affirming Williams' second conviction, the Iowa Supreme Court approved the trial court's use of the doctrine of inevitable discovery to
allow evidence derived from the body to be used at Williams' trial.4 5
Referring to the doctrine as "the hypothetical independent source"
exception to the exclusionary rule, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the necessary elements embodied in this exception were
met in the Williams case. These elements were: "1) that the police
did not act in bad faith for the purpose of hastening the discovery of
the evidence in question; and 2) that the evidence in question would
have been discovered by a lawful means." 4
With respect to the first element of the doctrine, the Iowa Su41. Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit - The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 307, 315-17 (1964). One of the first reported
cases using the doctrine of inevitable discovery is Somer v. U.S., 138 F.2d 790, 792 (2d Cir.
1943).
42. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
43. Id. at 437.
44. Id. at 437-38.
45. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa 1979).
46. Id. at 260.
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preme Court concluded that because there was a substantial disagreement over the validity of Detective Leaming's "interrogation"
among judges well-versed in criminal procedure at every level of the
appellate process, "it can't be said that the actions of the police were
taken in bad faith."' 7 Regarding the second element of the doctrine,
the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that by a preponderance of the
evidence, the State had shown that even without the illegally obtained statement, the ongoing police search would have turned up
the body of Pamela Powers before its condition had materially
changed.48
In 1981, Williams' request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was
denied by the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa.' 9 The District Court agreed with the Iowa Supreme Court
that the doctrine of inevitable discovery had been correctly applied
by the trial court in the case. Two years later, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of
the Writ.50 The eighth circuit accepted, arguendo, the Iowa Supreme Court's statement of the elements necessary for the
prosecutorial use of the inevitable discovery doctrine but disagreed
with the Iowa court's conclusion that the lack of bad faith requirement had been met in this case. 1 Specifically, the eighth circuit rejected the Iowa Supreme Court's reliance on the debate among
judges to demonstrate the lack of bad faith and instead focused on
what it believed was the intent of Detective Learning when he obtained the statement from Williams. Because the Supreme Court
had concluded in 1977 that Learning had "deliberately," "designedly," and "purposely" elicited incriminating statements from Williams, and Learning had not testified at the state suppression hearing
regarding his state of mind in taking the statement from Williams,
the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of showing that Learning's actions were taken without bad faith.52 Accordingly, the eighth
circuit found it unnecessary to consider whether the state court finding regarding the likely discovery of the body through legal means
was supported by the record or even whether the preponderance of
evidence standard adopted by the state court was the appropriate
47. Id. at 260-61.
48. Id. at 261-62.
49. Williams v. Nix, 528 F. Supp. 664 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
50. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164 (1983).
51. Id. at 1169.
52. Id. at 1170-73.
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one.

53

Reversing the eighth circuit, the Supreme Court held in Williams II that there was indeed an exception to the exclusionary rule
known as the doctrine of inevitable discovery, but that proper appli-

cation of the doctrine did not depend on a showing of the lack of bad
faith on the part of the police. 54 Therefore, the Court felt it unnecessary to enter the debate between the Iowa Supreme Court and the
eighth circuit concerning whether Detective Learning's "interroga-

tion" of Williams was not only illegal but also conducted in bad
faith. Instead, the Court ruled that where the state can show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the evidence discovered as a result of a police illegality would likely have been found eventually
through legal means, that evidence is admissible in the state's case-

in-chief.

55

Prior to the court's holding in Williams II, there was debate
among courts and commentators about the wisdom of such a "hypothetical independent source doctrine." Proponents argued that soci-

ety was being punished disproportionately when courts suppressed illegally obtained probative evidence that would inevitably have been
discovered through legal means. 56 Opponents objected to the speculative nature of the doctrine and its likely effect of encouraging improper police shortcuts to the detriment of the exclusionary rule's

goal of deterring such behavior.57 In Williams II, however, the Court
53. Id. at 1169.
54. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 442-48.
55. Id. at 444.
56. 3 LAFAvE, supra note 19, at 623. See, e.g., Papp v. Jago, 650 F.2d 1181 (6th Cir.
1981); United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Brookins,
614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1980); United States ex rel Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 867 (7th
Cir. 1975): Govt. of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 413 (1970); Wayne v. United
States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); Somer v. United
States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943); People v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 665, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 795 (1978); People v. Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d 139 (NY 1973). See also LaCount and
Girese, The "Inevitable Discovery" Rule, an Evolving Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 ALB. L. REv. 483 (1976); Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit - The
Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 307 (1964).
57. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 623. See. e.g., United States v. Houlton, 525 F.2d 943
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Castellana, 488 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1974); Parker v. Estelle,
498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 88, 99-100 (1974); Pitler, "The Fruits of
the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 579, (1968) [hereinafter
Pitler] (wherein the author writes:
For the present, the exclusionary rule, designed to discourage illegal activity
is useless if the police may unlawfully invade a man's home, illegally seize evidence and then claim "we would have obtained it anyway" and that the exclusionary rule is not designed to make the "theoretical availability" of evidence an
excuse for obtaining it illegally.

92

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER

1988

decided upon an application of the doctrine which was limited only
by the likelihood of discovery. As to this one limitation, the Court
imposed the lowest burden of proof conceivable.58 In defending its
decision to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine in this form, the
Court drew support from its prior decisions concerning derivative evidence and the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine.
The Court correctly referred to its prior holdings in
Silverthorne v. United States and Wong Sun v. United States for the
proposition that evidence which is derived from a police illegality
need not always be suppressed by the fruits of the poisonous tree
doctrine. Specifically, the Court quoted from Wong Sun as follows:
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for
the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question
in such a case is whether granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint. 59
This paragraph shows the view of the Wong Sun Court that the existence of a causal connection between illegal police conduct and the
discovery of evidence does not automatically require the suppression
of that evidence. Instead, courts should look to whether the police
exploited the illegality or recovered the evidence through other
means that are sufficiently remote as to be "purged" of the illegality."0 The court in Williams II, however, went far beyond this interpretation of the above passage and discerned that the Wong Sun
court "thus pointedly negated the kind of good faith requirement advanced by the Court of Appeals."'"
Id. at 630.
58. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444.
59. Id. at 442 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)).
60. One commentator interprets this paragraph in Wong Sun as offering a two step approach for analyzing causation for purposes of applying the exclusionary rule. First, the Court
requires a "logical" or "descriptive" process that looks to whether "but for" the illegality,
would the evidence have been discovered. If the evidence would not have been discovered without the illegality, there follows an "ascriptive" step that assesses the "continuing," "significant" impact of the illegal action upon the subsequent discovery of the evidence. Further, the
use of the term "exploitation" itself suggests that the Court would view the purposefulness of
the police conduct as relevant. Ruffin, Out on a Limb of the Poisonous Tree: The Tainted
Witness, 15 UCLA L. REV. 32, 38 (1967). See also, Pitler, supra note 57, at 588-89.
61. Williams I, 467 U.S. at 442. If by this statement the Court means only that the
Wong Sun Court was not imposing a mandatory good faith requirement on all applications of
the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine, that conclusion is rather unremarkable. If, on the
other hand, the Court is interpreting the "exploitation" paragraph of Wong Sun to mean that
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In adopting the inevitable discovery exception without a good
faith prerequisite, the Court found support for its position in the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule's derivative evidence principle. The derivative evidence principle, according to the
Court in Williams II, rests on the notion that society needs to deter
police from gaining any benefit from their illegal conduct whether
that benefit be direct or indirect. To accomplish that deterrent pur-

pose, derivative evidence acquired as a result of an antecedent illegal
police practice is not useable by the government even though that
evidence is probative on the issue of the defendant's guilt.6 2 On the

other hand, the Court observed, application of the independent
source exception insures that the prosecution will be put "in no
worse position" because of some earlier police error or misconduct.63
According to the Court, this principle of putting the police in the

same position that they would have been in had the illegality not
occurred achieves the proper balance between the competing societal
interests of deterring police impropriety and having juries receive all
probative evidence. Since, in its opinion, the inevitable discovery doc-

trine and independent source doctrines have a "functional similarity," the Court maintained that, as with the independent source doctrine, the "no worse off" principle should be applied when
considering the breadth and the limitations of the inevitable discovery doctrine."'
In a recent article, Professors Wasserstrom and Merten have
taken issue with the Court's grafting of the "no worse off" principle

onto the exclusionary rule.6" They note that in those cases which created and fleshed out the independent source rule, such as
Silverthorne, the Court never relied on the "no worse off" justificathe good faith (absence of purposefulness and flagrance in the illegal police activity) of the
police is irrelevant to a decision whether to suppress derivative evidence, that is a novel approach to the fruits doctrine supported by neither precedent nor logic. In fact, in deciding
whether derivative evidence obtained after an illegal police action can avoid suppression because of the attenuation doctrine, (the very issue in Wong Sun, to which the "exploitation"
paragraph was directed), the Court has consistently assessed the purposefulness and the flagrance of the police illegality. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 693 (1982); Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 99-100 (1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979);
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1978); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604
(1975). Were the fact that an officer acted purposefully in violating a suspect's rights irrelevant in considering whether to apply the exclusionary rule, the rule would lose much of its
deterrent impact. United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1970)).
62. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 442-43.
63. Id. at 443.
64. Id. at 443-44.
65. Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a
Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 158-66 (1984).
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tion, but instead emphasized that where there is an independent
source which leads to the discovery of evidence, no exploitation of
the illegality has in fact occurred." Further, if the "no worse off"
rule is interpreted to mean what it seems to say, the Court is communicating to the police that there is no real price to be paid for
illegal conduct no matter how flagrant or purposeful, and regardless
of how seriously a specific constitutional right is affected,6 7 when another source of discovery exists. It is not difficult to see how this
principle would materially diminish the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule.
Even if one accepts the Court's questionable grafting of the "no
worse off" concept onto the independent source rule, the Court's assertion that the "no worse off" concept would therefore automatically be applicable to the inevitable discovery doctrine is unpersuasive. Without analysis, the Court discerns a "functional similarity"
between the independent source and the inevitable discovery doctrines which logically compels the application of the "no worse off"
rule to the inevitable discovery doctrine. The "no worse off" rule
then serves as a justification for the Court's holding that the question
of whether the police acted purposefully or flagrantly in committing
their illegality is irrelevant to the issue of whether the inevitable discovery doctrine applies. A closer examination of the doctrine of inevitable discovery reveals that it is different from the independent
source rule in a fundamental way and, in fact, is more properly compared to another exception to the exclusionary rule's derivative evidence principle, attenuation." Once it is understood how the inevitable discovery doctrine is fundamentally similar to the attenuation
exception, it then follows that, as with the attenuation doctrine,
courts considering application of the inevitable discovery exception
should assess the purposefulness and flagrance of the police
misconduct.
66. Id. at 159.
67. Different constitutional rights are designed to safeguard different interests and, arguably, require the protection of the exclusionary rule in different ways. Thus deciding
whether to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine to evidence obtained in violation of the sixth
amendment may require a consideration of different factors than deciding its application in a
fourth amendment case. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 452-57 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also,
Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 65, at 175-78; Comment, Inevitable Discovery: the Hypothetical Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 137,
140-43 (1976).
68. Attenuation or " 'dissipation of the taint' attempts to mark the point at which the
detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
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As the Court conceded, the independent source exception is not
applicable to the facts of Nix v. Williams since the sole source of the
discovery of the Powers girl's body was the illegal statement ob-

tained from Williams. 9 While the independent search for the girl's
body may have ultimately discovered the body, whether it actually
would have is clearly a hypothetical question. Although the Court
noted and then quickly passed over this distinction, it is an essential

one in any exclusionary rule analysis.
When there is no causal link between the police illegality and
the ultimate discovery of secondary evidence in question because the
police use a source independent of the illegality to uncover the evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.70 When there is such a
causal link, the derivative evidence principle of the exclusionary rule
applies, but it then becomes necessary to determine whether the need
to exclude the evidence is overcome by countervailing factors. 7 Such

a situation exists, for example, when the effect of an illegal police
action upon the ultimate discovery of evidence is attenuated to such
a degree that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would
not require the suppression of the derivative evidence. 72 Where this
causal connection exists, courts typically focus on whether there has
been an exploitation of the illegal police conduct in determining
whether the evidence acquired should be excluded.73
An examination of the existence and the degree of exploitation
necessarily includes an assessment of the intent of the police officer
and the degree of approbrium that should be attached to the police

activity involved." ' Using the fourth amendment as his subject,
69. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 443.
70. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963) (quoting from Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
71. Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 233-34 (1981); 3 LAFAVE, supra note 19,
at 616-18; Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 16 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1043, 1049-50 (1982). For similar reasoning with respect to application of the
fourth amendment, see Moylan, The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable v. The Fourth -Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold of "So What." 1977 So. ILL. L.J. 75 (1977).
72. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); 3 LAFAvE,
supra note 19, at 615; Note, Fruits of the Poisonous Tree - A Plea For Relevant Criteria,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136, 1148-49 (1967).
73. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 437
U.S. 268, 274-75 (1978); Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88; United States v. Martinez, 512 F.2d
830, 832 (5th Cir. 1975); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963). See also, Rulin, supra note 60 at 38, 73; Note, supra note 71 at
1048-49.
74. See United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 570 (2nd Cir. 1970). In Edmons, the court
said: "the Government exploits an unlawful arrest when it obtains a conviction on the basis of
the very evidence . . . which it hoped to obtain by its unconstitutional act." Id. at 584. See
also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279-80; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 604; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974); 3 LAFAVE supra note 19, at 673; Pitler, supra note
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Judge Charles Moylan has explained the distinction between a situation in which a principle is inapplicable and one in which it may be
deemed to have been satisfied.7 5 Primarily, this difference reflects a
distinction between defining the limits of the principle on one hand
and describing its values on another. Although the ultimate result of
a finding that the fourth amendment is inapplicable is the same as a
finding that the fourth amendment is satisfied (that is, the evidence
is admissible), the reasoning which leads to this result is quite different. In Judge Moylan's words:
When the Fourth Amendment is satisfied, Constitutional
liberty is vindicated. God is in his heaven and all is right with
the world. Involved is a matrix of values including such fine
things as warrants, oaths and affirmations, particularity of
description, probable cause, exigency, good faith on the part of
the police officer and the sanctity of thresholds . . . . When
however the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable, good and evil
have no relevance. 76

Similarly, the independent source exception can be viewed as a
situation in which the exclusionary rule is inapplicable because there
is no causal connection between the illegality and discovery of the
evidence.77 Both the attenuation and inevitable discovery doctrines,
on the other hand, are examples of the exclusionary rule satisfied in
that the illegal police conduct involved in each does lead to the discovery of the challenged evidence, but other factors relevant to the
purposes behind the exclusionary rule may result in overcoming the
need to suppress the evidence."'

In its treatment of the attenuation doctrine, the Supreme Court
has consistently acknowledged the importance of looking to the in-

tent of the police officer and the nature of his illegal conduct.79
There are two reasons why the fact that an officer committed an
illegality purposefully and in a flagrant manner would be relevant to
56, at 597.
75. Moylan, supra note 71, at 75.
76. Id.
77. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 478. See also Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210,
233-34, 415 N.E.2d 818, 822 (1981); Note, supra note 71 at 1049.
78. Regarding attenuation, see United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 274-75; Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. at 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass.
210, 233-34, 415 N.E.2d 818, 822 (1981); Ruffin, supra note 60, at 73; Comment, supra note
65, at 147; Note, supra note 71, at 1050.
79. See. e.g., Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 693; Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98, 109-10 (1982); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279-80 (1978); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 604-05, 609-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
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any analysis of whether the doctrine of attenuation should be applied
to the facts of a given case. First, the more flagrant and purposeful
the police conduct is, the less likely it is that the impact of the con-

duct upon the defendant would be weakened.80 For example, in a
situation in which the defendant challenges a confession that is obtained after an illegal arrest, the details surrounding that illegal arrest concerning the bad faith, purposefulness and the flagrance of the
police conduct would be important factors. The more outrageous the
police conduct in effecting the illegal arrest, the more likely it is that
the impact of that illegality would still be felt by the defendant at
the time he makes his statement and, therefore, the less likely it is
that the impact of the illegality has attenuated.
The second reason why courts and commentators have looked to

the flagrancy and the purposefulness of police wrongdoing in attenuation cases is because such conduct impacts directly and significantly
on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule."1 In Brown v. Illinois,8" the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of a state-

ment made following an illegal arrest and after the proper administration of the Miranda warnings. The Court noted that: "[i]f
Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of
an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful
the Fourth Amendment violations, the effect of the Exclusionary
Rule would be substantially diluted."8 3 In holding that statement to
be a fruit of the improper arrest, the Court in Brown relied to a

significant extent on its conclusion that the intent of the officers in
80. See Brown v. Illinois, 442 U.S. at 604. The Brown Court referred to the purposefulness and the flagrancy of the police action as the "most important" factors in determining
attenuation. See also, Brown, 442 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring); Bain & Kelly, Fruits
of the Poisonous Tree: Recent Developments as Viewed Through It's Exceptions, 31 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 615, 648 (1977). In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court,
after noting the need to assess the costs and deterrent benefits of applying the exclusionary
rule, said: "Not surprisingly in view of this purpose, an assessment of the flagrancy of the
police misconduct constitutes an important step in the process." Id. at 911.
81. See 3 LAFAVE supra note 19, at 653, 658-59; Comment, The Fourth Amendment
and Tainted Confessions: Admissibility As A Policy Decision, 13 Hous. L. REV. 753, 768-72
(1976); Note, supra note 72, at 1148-50; Note, supra note 71 at 1050. See also Wasserstrom
& Mertens, supra note 65, at 155 n.465 (describing the holding in Taylor v. Alabama, 457
U.S. 687 (1982) as a reflection of the Supreme Court's recognition that application of the
attenuation doctrine requires more than just an assessment of how much the taint has actually
dissipated. Additionally the Court, in the author's opinion, must have placed significant weight
on the fact that "the police succeeded in obtaining just what they sought to gain"). Once it is
established that the police have purposely and flagrantly violated a suspects constitutional
rights, the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule warrants suppression of the defendant's
confession.
82. 422 U.S, 590 (1975).
83. Id. at 602.
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effecting the arrest was to elicit the very statement at issue.84 Furthermore, as Justice Powell pointed out in his concurring opinion,
where the illegal police conduct is flagrant, the need for the deterrence achieved by the application of the exclusionary rule is more
acute.8 5
In Taylor v. Alabama,8" both the five justice majority and the
three justices who joined in Justice O'Connor's dissent agreed that
the flagrancy and purposefulness of the police conduct is an important fact in determining whether the defendant's statement was a
fruit of her illegal arrest.8 7 The issue in United States v. Ceccolini8 8
was whether the testimony of a witness discovered through an illegal
search could be said to be sufficiently unconnected to the illegal
search so that the attenuation exception would apply. After discussing the difference between live witnesses and inanimate objects for
purposes of applying the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine, the
Court noted that the officer's illegal search was committed without
the intent to find such a witness. The Court concluded that absent
such an intent there would be no deterrent impact in suppressing the
89
witness' testimony.
When the prosecution seeks to have evidence admitted through
the doctrine of inevitable discovery, it is understood that, as with
evidence sought to be introduced through the attenuation exception,
the discovery of the evidence in question was derived in fact from the
knowledge gained through illegal police activity.9 0 Therefore, as with
the attenuation doctrine, and unlike the independent source rule,
consideration of the inevitable discovery doctrine presumes that the
exclusionary rule is applicable. If evidence is ultimately admitted
based on the inevitable discovery exception, again as with attenuation and unlike the independent source rule, the exclusionary rule,
although applicable, has been satisfied. In assessing whether the exclusionary rule has been satisfied, courts should consider all of the
relevant purposes, values, principles and balancing factors that accompany the rule and then apply it to the facts of the case at hand.91
84. Id. at 604.
85. Id. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring).
86. 457 U.S. 687 (1982).
87. Id. at 693. See also, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 99-100 (1980).
88. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
89. Id. at 279-80. See also, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In Dunaway,
the Court noted that where a close causal connection exists between an illegal detention and
subsequent confession, there is a greater need for the deterrent protection of the exclusionary
rule. Id. at 218.
90. Williams II 467 U.S. at 443.
91. See Moylan, supra note 71, at 75.
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Unfortunately, in adopting its version of the inevitable discovery doctrine in Williams H, the Court concluded that any time the challenged evidence would more likely than not have been discovered
even without the illegal police conduct, then "the deterrence ration' For
ale has so little basis that the evidence should be received." 92
those who might doubt this assertion, the Court continued, "anything less would reject logic, experience and common sense."93
The Court's conclusion that there is never a benefit to be derived from excluding illegally obtained evidence once the prosecution

can show the likelihood of ultimate discovery through lawful means

is a most significant one. The result of such a conclusion is that
courts will essentially ignore illegal police activity that may be both

purposeful and flagrant. In other words, if the prosecutor can convince the judge that evidence more likely than not would have been
discovered even without the illegal police conduct, it is immaterial to
the admissibility of that evidence that the police knowingly violated
the defendant's rights in order to uncover that very evidence.
In refusing to require courts to do a case by case assessment of
the need to deter (as demonstrated by the purposefulness and flagrance of the police misconduct) before applying the inevitable dis-

covery doctrine, the Court not only rejects comparison to attenuation
cases but additionally ignores a significant aspect of recent exclusionary rule cases. 94 As the concept of deterrence has become the
prime justification for the exclusionary rule,95 the Court has consistently examined the nature of the wrong and the purposefulness of
police misconduct.96 Only recently the Court ruled that, at least in
92. Williams II 467 U.S. at 444.
93. Id.
94. See, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908-12 (1984) (requiring case-by-case
analysis of whether deterrence would be achieved by admitting evidence seized pursuant to
invalid search warrant); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (case-by-case assessment of
multiple factors in determining attenuation); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982) (reaffirming case-by-case approach taken in Brown); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268
(1978) (rejecting per se rule re live witness not being "fruit" in favor of case-by-case analysis
of cost/benefit factors); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (rejecting per se rule
regarding application of sixth amendment-based exclusionary rule to attorney-client privilege
violation in favor or assessing several factors including the purposefulness of the police violation); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (multifactor case-by-case approach to admissibility of statement following illegal detention).
95. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 908-21 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 446 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 536 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
96. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-25; Taylor, 457 U.S. at 693; Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 99100; Janis, 428 U.S. at 458-59 n.35; Brown, 422 U.S. at 602, 604; United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). See also Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); United
States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584 (1970); Pitler, supra note 57, at 597; Comment, supra
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warrant cases, the determining factor in the decision whether to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is
whether the police acted in good faith.9 7 In other words, evidence

will be suppressed if the police purposely avoided the requirements
of the fourth amendment in obtaining a warrant or should have
known that the warrant that they acted upon was in fact deficient. 98
Given the Supreme Court's inclination to look at both the pur-

posefulness and the flagrancy of police illegality in exclusionary rule
decisions, and the significance of these two factors in accomplishing
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it is important to analyze the Court's justification for eliminating consideration of these
factors with respect to application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. In Williams H the Court specifically rejected the eighth circuit's conclusion that: "[i]f an absence of bad faith requirement were
not imposed, the temptation to risk deliberate violations of the Sixth
Amendment would be too great and the deterrent effect of the Ex-

clusionary Rule reduced too far." 99 The Court reasoned that an officer who has the opportunity to acquire evidence illegally will seldom be able to determine at that time whether the evidence sought
would be discovered inevitably by legal means. Since deterrence is
achieved only when an officer is aware of the consequences of his
illegal conduct and in inevitable discovery factual scenarios he cannot so calculate, the Court concluded that no deterrent benefit is
achieved by suppressing evidence that likely would have been discovered in any event. 00 If, however, the officer does believe that the

evidence will likely be discovered by legal means, he has no incentive
to shortcut the legal method, presumably because of the danger that
suppression would result.' ° ' In the Court's view, the fear of departmental discipline and the possibility of incurring civil liability also
note 67 at 142-3; Comment, supra note 81 at 753, 768-72; Note, supra note 71 at 148-51.
97. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Massachusetts v. Shephard, 468 U.S.
981 (1984).
98. See id.
99. Williams II,467 U.S. at 465 (quoting from Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1169
n.5 (1983).
100. Williams II 467 U.S. at 445-46.
101. One might just as reasonably assert that when an officer believes evidence he is
thinking of obtaining illegally will ultimately be discovered by legal means, he may as well use
the illegal shortcut because the evidence will be admitted in any event under the Court's test.
When he believes the evidence will not be legally discovered ultimately, he still may as well
use the illegal shortcut because he has a chance to later convince a judge of a hypothetical
legal discovery, and, in any event, he loses nothing by illegally obtaining evidence he could not
otherwise obtain. Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 65, at 167-71; Comment, Leading
Cases of the 1983 Supreme Court Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 125-26 (1984); Note, supra
note 71, at 1143.
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discourages the police officer from using illegal shortcuts." 2 This explanation of why it is irrelevant to consider the possible bad faith of
a police officer in applying the inevitable discovery doctrine reflects a
skewed view of both the need and the means necessary to discourage
purposeful police misconduct as well as a surprising naivete about
law enforcement in general.
As the Court noted, an officer contemplating illegal conduct to
acquire evidence will likely be unable to judge whether that same
evidence would "inevitably" be discovered by legal means. This assertion, while possibly valid, is largely irrelevant because of the
Court's misleading use of the word "inevitable." The Court's assertion makes sense only if the word inevitable is used in its dictionary
sense, that is, "incapable of being avoided." ' 3 Later, within the Williams I opinion, we learn that the Court's use of the inevitable discovery doctrine really means that an officer need show only the likelihood of discovery by a preponderance of the evidence. 1"' In other
words, when contemplating the use of an illegal shortcut to obtain
evidence, an officer will know that illegally seized evidence can be
saved if a judge can be persuaded that it was more likely than not
that the evidence would have been discovered eventually through
other means. While an officer rarely may be in a position to assess
whether a piece of evidence will "inevitably" be discovered, it is far
more likely that he will be able to form a reasonable opinion about
whether the evidence "probably" will be discovered. If an officer
concludes that evidence he is contemplating obtaining illegally would
likely be later discovered legally, and acting on this assumption he
chooses the illegal shortcut to obtain the evidence, a decision to admit such evidence would clearly weaken the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule. 0 5
As the Court has repeatedly asserted, the exclusionary rule best
serves its goals when it is applied in situations of bad faith misconduct by the police."0 6 The more purposeful the misconduct, the
102. Williams II 467 U.S. at 444.
103. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 672 (1969).
104. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444. The Court still requires a showing of "inevitability"
but this "inevitability" must be shown only by a preponderance of the evidence, thus making
use of the word "inevitable" superfluous if not misleading.
105. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
106. In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, (1974), the Court stated:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the
police have engaged in willful, or at the very least, negligent conduct which has
deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a
result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating
officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the
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greater the need to deter and the more effective is the lesson for

those contemplating future illegalities.1 0 7 Conversely, allowing the
use of evidence which is discovered through a deliberate violation of
the law communicates to the police the possibility, if not the likelihood, of benefiting from their own purposeful wrongdoing.10 8 Quite
often the pressure upon police to conclude an investigation is intense,
and the temptation to act without obeying the rules is great. The

doctrine of inevitable discovery, when applied without any regard for
the purposefulness or flagrant nature of the police misconduct, adds
immeasurably to that temptation. 0 9 There may be, therefore, contrary to the Court's assertion, much to be gained in a police officer's

mind from acting illegally when he believes the evidence is likely to
be eventually discovered by legal means. When there is in the police

officer's mind a likelihood of ultimate discovery, he can save time
and avoid what may be viewed as needless effort by choosing an illegal shortcut.
The Court's response to this contention is to take note of "significant disincentives," other than the exclusionary rule, that act as a

deterrence to police misconduct. As examples, the Court cites departmental disciplinary proceedings and the possibility of civil liability." 0 In fact, neither of these "significant disincentives" has ever
been shown to act as a meaningful deterrent to police illegality.
Those constitutional violations which cause no physical injury are
rarely the cause for police discipline."' Civil suits as a solution to
police actions in violation of the exclusionary rule have been largely
rights of the accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good
faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.
Id. at 447. See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 907-12; United States v. Janis, 433 U.S.
433, 459 n.35 (1976); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring);
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537-39 (1975).
107. Brown, 422 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring); 3 LAFAVE supra note 19, at 616;
Israel, Criminal Procedure: The Burger Court and The Legacy of the Warren Court, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1413-14 (1977); Pitler, supra note 57 at 597; Comment, supra note 67,
at 142-43; Comment, supra note 81, at 772; Note, Inevitable Discovery in New York: Further
Limitation of the Exclusionary Rule, 43 ALB. L. REV. 145, 159 (1978); Note, supra note 71,
at 1150.
108. 3 LAFAVE supra note 19, at 658; Pitler, supra note 57, at 597, 630; Note, supra
note 56, at 99-100.
109. Comment, supra note 10, at 126; Note, supra note II, at 1143; Note, supra note
57, at 99. In Professor LaFave's words, "If the rule [Inevitable Discovery] were applied when
such a shortcut was intentionally taken, the effect would be to read out of the Fourth Amendment the requirement that other more elaborate and protective procedures be followed." 3
LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 624.
110. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 446.
111. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L.
REV. 493, 494 (1955). Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary
Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 243, 273 (1973).
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unsuccessful because of the unlikelihood of actual and significant recovery by plaintiffs. 112 Imagine, for example, Robert Williams appearing before a jury of Iowans and requesting money damages

against Detective Leaming and the State of Iowa for violating Williams' sixth amendment rights by tricking him into revealing where
he discarded the lifeless body of Pamela Powers. The vast majority
of criminal offenders as plaintiffs in such cases are unlikely to draw
sympathy or recover significant damages from police defendants. Accordingly, attorneys are unlikely to take such cases on a contingency
basis, and hence, it is unsurprising that so few of these cases have
actually gone to trial. 1 '
In those situations where the officer believes it is unlikely that
the evidence will ever be discovered except for his illegal methods, a
thinking officer might believe he has nothing to lose by undertaking
such illegal conduct and hoping he can later convince a sympathetic
judge of the hypothetical likelihood of legal discovery. 1 Thus, con-

trary to the Court's assertion, after Williams II, a police officer may
contemplate an illegal method for acquiring evidence, and quite reasonably conclude that the illegal method is a worthwhile means of
pursuit despite the fact that the evidence would most likely not have
been discovered through legal means.
It appears that under Williams H, the only curb on the use of
the doctrine of inevitable discovery is the requirement that the police
show the probability of discovery by legal means.1 1 5 In the Court's
view, to exclude evidence that would likely have been discovered

eventually through legal means results in a major weakening of the
truth finding process without achieving any concomitant benefit in
112. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45
N.Y.U.LREv. 785, 787 (1970); Spiotto, supra note 109 at 272; See also Newman, Suing the
Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers'
Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 454 (1978) (suggesting why the plaintiffs might be unsuccessful: "[alt the defendant's table sits the police officers - well groomed, in full uniform and
with the American flag figuratively wrapped around them . . . the . . . plaintiff is likely to be
Black or Puerto Rican, poor, disheveled, a felon and often a drug addict."). See generally,
Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781 (1979); Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 372 (1970) (arguing that an effective tort remedy would
deter lawful police misconduct and an ineffective tort remedy would provide no deterrence).
113. Amsterdam, supra note 112, at 787 (offering other reasons attorney might not be
anxious to sue police); Foote, supra note 11l, at 500; Wassertstrom & Mertens, supra note
112, at 408 n.209 (lawyer unlikely to take case based on unpredictability of damages and
client unlikely to assume high legal fees in such a situation).
114. See supra note 101.
115. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444, 447. "But when, as here, the evidence in question
would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct,
there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible." Id. at 448.

92

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER

1988

deterrence. Such a factorless interpretation of the doctrine can cause
grave harm to certain fundamental constitutional protections. Per-

haps most obvious among these protections threatened by the Court's
broad application of the inevitable discovery doctrine is the warrant

requirement of the fourth amendment.' 16
Taken literally, the Court's opinion in Williams H would permit
the use of evidence seized in a house that the police have probable
cause to search but for which they deliberately postpone seeking a
warrant. The police could argue that since a warrant would have

been obtained had one been sought (as probable cause to search was
present), and since the evidence would have been discovered anyway,
it should be admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. In
Segura v. United States, 1 7 the Court applied similar reasoning in its
use of the independent source doctrine to save certain evidence
seized after a warrantless entry into a house." 8
The Supreme Court has yet to confront a situation either directly or indirectly in which it would need to determine whether the
doctrine of inevitable discovery could be used to overcome deliberate

police attempts to avoid the warrant requirement." 9 Both state and
federal courts have come to different conclusions as to whether evi-

dence seized without a warrant should be admitted under the inevi116. The Warrant Clause of the fourth amendment reads, "and no Warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
117. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
118. In Segura, the Court was faced with a warrantless entry into the defendant's house
effected in order to "secure" the house and avoid the destruction or removal of evidence. As
soon as possible, a warrant would have been obtained and a full search of the premises conducted. During the entry into the house and a security check that was conducted shortly thereafter, contraband was observed in plain view. Id. at 800-01.
Some 19 hours after the initial entry, the police obtained a proper search warrant and
conducted a full search of the apartment. Cocaine, a revolver, and $150,000 in cash were
among the items seized during the warrant-based search. Id. at 801.
The Supreme Court did not address the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence
observed during the initial entry and security check, as the product of an illegal entry. The
Court focused its attention instead on the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant,
evidence alleged by the defendant similarly to be the "fruit" of the illegal entry. Id. at 813.
The Court held that this evidence was obtained not during the initial entry and possession
of the home but instead during the warrant-based search. As the warrant authorizing the
search was based on information entirely independent of that acquired during the illegal entry
and occupation of the apartment, the independent source exception allows for the admissibility
of the evidence. In so holding, the Court specifically rejected the contention of the dissenting
justices that given the possibility of removal or destruction of the evidence by the defendant's
cohorts before the warrant was obtained, the seizure of the challenged evidence was dependent
on the illegal entry and continued possession of the apartment. Thus, according to the dissent,
the independent source exception was inapplicable. Id. at 831-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
Court's response was to label this possibility of destruction or removal as "pure speculation."
Id. at 816.
119. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
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table discovery doctrine.12 0 Significantly, post-Williams H cases admitting such evidence have taken a view of the inevitable discovery
doctrine similar to that proposed by the Court in Williams H; since
ultimately the evidence would likely have been discovered through
legal means, the police should not be unduly punished for their failure to obtain a warrant.1"2 ' The danger of such thinking is that it
reflects nothing less than a direct attack upon the principles behind
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.
The purpose of the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment is to insure that magistrates will be interposed between the
forces of government and the individual suspect. 12 These magistrates are charged with the responsibility of forming their own opinions as to whether probable cause exists prior to the time that the
120. Cases rejecting application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to searches conducted in violation of the warrant requirement include: United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d
827 (11 th Cir. 1984): United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 198 1);United
States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974); People v. Young, 159 Cal. App. 3d 138, 205
Cal. Rptr. 402, (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Schoondermark, 717 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 415 N.E.2d 818 (1981); State v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 1981); State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 495 A.2d 90 (1985); People
v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689, 442 N.E.2d 531, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1981); People v. Sciacca, 45
N.Y.2d 122, 379 N.E.2d 1153, 356 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1978). But see United States v. Whitehorn,
No. 86-5524, Slip op. at (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736 (5th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Moscatiello & Carter, 771 F.2d 589 (lst Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, Murray and Carter v. U.S., 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987); United States v. Merriweather,
777 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Krukoff v. State, 702 P.2d
664, 666 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137, 1139
(D.C. 1985); State v. Butler, 676 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1984); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 709
P.2d 225 (1985).
121. See. e.g., United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1986); State v. Butler,
676 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo. 1984). See also United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir.
1985) (noting the significance of the "no worse off' principle to the Williams iI Court's approach to inevitable discovery, yet warning that application of such a principle may cause
irreparable damage to the exclusionary rule). Id. at 1203. See generally, United States v.
Whitehorn, No. 86-5524 Slip op. at - (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Merriweather, 777
F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1985); Krukoff v. State, 702 P.2d 664, 666 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985).
122. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1984). In McDonald, the Court
stated:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant
serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment
has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done
not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It
was done so that an objective mind might weight the need to invade that privacy
in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to
entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the
arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police
acting on their own cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the
home.
Id. at 455-56. See also J. HALL, SEARCH & SEIZURE 178-80 (1982).
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government is permitted to intrude into those areas protected by the
fourth amendment. Post hoc judicial determinations of probable
cause in situations where warrants are clearly required, result in ail
abandonment of the magistrate's role as a buffer between the state
and its citizens. 12 3 Applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to warrant avoidance situations would, as a matter of course, permit the
police to enter, search, and seize based on probable cause alone since
they can demonstrate later that a warrant could have been obtained.
There would be no reason for the police to engage in what is widely
perceived as the burdensome requirement of obtaining a warrant. 2 4
Under such an approach, if there is not sufficient evidence to
constitute probable cause, no warrant would have been issued and
nothing is lost. If there is probable cause, police can act without a
warrant and come back later and show that had they taken the time
and the effort to obtain a warrant, the evidence would similarly have
been discovered. Segura makes this post hoc determination easier by
rejecting the defendant's claim that the evidence might have
changed in form or been relocated in the time it would have taken
the police to obtain a warrant. 2 5 A literal reading of Williams II,
especially with regard to its concern for insuring that the police be
left in a position no worse off than they would have been absent their
illegality, would seem to compel the admission of such evidence.
Because Williams II does not deal directly with a warrant situation, the door is open to interpret the inevitable discovery doctrine in
a way that does not have this detrimental impact on the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment. For example, courts could require for application of the doctrine that some effort to obtain the
warrant be under way at the time the police illegally entered the
house in question and seized the evidence. Such a limitation of the
doctrine would be consistent with the factual situations in Williams
I!, where the search for the girl's body was underway at the time
123. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (1 Ith Cir. 1984); United States v.
Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 961
(6th Cir. 1974); People v. Schoondcrmark, 717 P.2d 504. 506 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 415 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1981); State v. Johnson, 301
N.W.2d 625, 629 (N.D. 1981); LaCount & Girese, supra note 21, at 506; Note, supra note
71, at 1054.
124. See, e.g., R. VAN DUIZERD. H. SULLON & C. CARLER. THE SEARCH WARRANT
PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS. PRACTICES, (National Center for State Courts,
1984) (concluding that "the plain fact of the matter is that many police officers perceive the
warrant requirement as inhibiting the effective performance of their duty"). Id. at 77; J. SKOLNICK. JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, 228 (2d ed. 1966).
125. Segura v. New York, 468 U.S. at 801-02.
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Detective Learning illegally learned of its whereabouts, 26 and in
Segura, where certain officers had instituted attempts to obtain a
warrant when their colleagues entered Segura's apartment. 27 Some
courts and commentators have adopted this approach to the doctrine
of inevitable discovery; they maintain that the doctrine should be ap-

plied only where there is already in existence at the time of the illegal discovery of evidence a demonstrable process
at work which
1 28

would likely have produced the same evidence.
Others, including the attorney who represented the state of
Iowa in Williams II, have suggested that in order for the doctrine of
inevitable discovery to be applied without the additional requirement
of looking to the intent of the police, the government should have to
show that the hypothetical legal discovery of the evidence would
have occurred through an investigation entirely independent of the
illegal discovery.1 29 Thus, where there is a race to the evidence between an investigation involving illegal police methods and an independent legal search, the fact that the illegal actions actually led to

the discovery of the evidence would not result in its suppression if it
can be shown that the lawful investigation would likely have uncov-

ered the evidence eventually.' Again, application of this limited
form of the inevitable discovery doctrine would be consistent with
the result in Williams II since the systematic search that the Court
concluded would have eventually led to the body of Pamela Powers
126. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 448-49.
127. Segura, 468 U.S. at 801-02.
128. See. e.g., United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1985). In Cherry, the
Court said:
[w]hen the police have not been in active pursuit of an alternative line of
investigation that is at a minimum supportable by leads, the general application
of the inevitable discovery exception would greatly encourage the police to engage in illegal conduct because (I) the police would usually be less certain that
the discovery of the evidence is 'inevitable' in the absence of illegal conduct and
(2) the danger that the evidence illegally obtained may be inadmissible would be
reduced.
Id. at 1204-05. See also United States v. Amuny, 767 F.2d 1128-29 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (I lth Cir. 1984); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d
1037, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624, 631-32 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. 1985); State v. Holman, 109
Idaho 382, 391-92, 707 P.2d 493, 502-03 (1985); Appel, The Inevitable Discovery Exception
to the Exclusionary Rule, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 1101, II, 12-13 (1985); Note, supra note 71, at
1060, 1063 and cases cited therein. Other courts have not required that an independent lawful
investigation be in progress at the time the evidence is illegally obtained. See, e.g., Bonuchi v.
Wyrick, No. 83-0877 slip op. at (W.D. Mo. Jul. 18, 1985); United States v. Silvestri,
787 F.2d 736, 744-46 (Ist Cir. 1986); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 293-94, 709 P.2d 225, 24243 (1985) (specifically interpreting Williams II as not requiring that the lawful investigation
already be in progress).
129. Appel, supra note 128, at 110-15.
130. Id.
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was conducted independent of Detective Learning's interaction with

Williams.1"'
Under this theory, evidence which ultimately would have been
discovered legally through the same process that in fact led to the
illegal discovery of the evidence is characterized as "dependent" and
is treated differently in examining its admissibility. In such situations, the purpose for the police offering a hypothetical independent
source of discovery would only be to avoid suffering the consequences of their illegal conduct. In fact, they then would benefit
from their illegal conduct. Before the court is asked to cure the illegality and reconstruct the investigation along hypothetical legal
lines, this theory requires a close examination of the need for deter-

rence in such situations. Specifically, factors such as the bad faith of
the police officer and the flagrant nature of the illegality are relevant
in determining whether the exclusionary rule requires the suppression of evidence so discovered.132
Under this approach to inevitable discovery, a house search
where probable cause was present but no warrant obtained would be
treated in a different manner than the investigation in the Williams
H case. Since the hypothetical legal discovery of the evidence of this
warrant avoidance situation would be "dependent," before the inevi-

table discovery doctrine were applied in such a situation, a close examination of the officer's motivation would ensue. If a police officer

was found to have acted deliberately to avoid the warrant requirement, the deterrence based exclusionary rule would presumably require suppression of the evidence. Although as previously mentioned,
the Court's opinion in Williams H would survive such an application
of the inevitable discovery doctrine, the Segura rationale might have

to be changed. 33
131. Id. at 114-18.
132. Id. See generally Note, supra note 71, at 1055-57.
133. In Williams I1the search for the girl's body was being conducted entirely independent of Detective Learning's questioning of Williams; whereas in Segura, the illegal entry and
continued possession of the apartment which led to the police's gaining custody of the evidence
likely would be viewed as part of the same line of investigation that resulted in the seizure of
the evidence pursuant to a warrant (and therefore "dependent"). See Segura 468 U.S. at 799802. Therefore under Appel's theory, the Williams 11Court was correct in looking only to the
likelihood of discovery, whereas the Segura Court should have assessed the motivation or bad
faith of the officers as well before denying application of the exclusionary rule. Appel, supra
note 128, at 122-23.
The single reference to the "good faith" of the officers in Segura occurs in a portion of
Chief Justice Burger's opinion, joined only by Justice O'Connor, which asserts that the original
entry and continued possession of the apartment was justified. The reference to the apparent
"good faith" of the officers is made to overcome an argument that the officers' remaining
without a warrant in the apartment for 19 hours made the seizure unreasonable. Segura, 468
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Both of these aforementioned limitations on the inevitable discovery doctrine maintain the key features of the doctrine while providing some check on the doctrine's probable result of reducing the

deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule. Unfortunately, the Court's
reasoning in Williams I seems to preclude either of these more lim-

ited approaches to the inevitable discovery doctrine. If, as the Court
asserts, the inevitable discovery doctrine is conceptually similar to
the independent source doctrine and the latter doctrine compels the
police to be placed in a position no worse off than they would have
been but for the illegality, then the only requirement for application
of the doctrine in any circumstance would be the likelihood of dis-

covery by some form of legal means.1"" Although the existence of an
ongoing independent legal investigation presumably increases the

likelihood of discovery, it is by no means necessary that an investigation be either ongoing or independent for one to conclude that the
discovery through legal means more likely than not would have occurred.135 Nothing in the Williams H opinion suggests adoption of
this dependent/independent approach.
Returning to the warrant avoidance situation, suppose that the
police deliberately decide not to seek a warrant from a magistrate
because they do not wish to undertake the task of locating the magistrate or drafting an affidavit or because they do not wish to run the

risk of being denied their warrant or granted a warrant which limits
the search in some way. Instead, the police deliberately and knowingly violate the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment and
conduct a warrantless search. At a suppression hearing held after the

evidence is uncovered, the government is able to demonstrate that
when the police acted, they in fact possessed the requisite probable
cause and would most likely have been granted a warrant had one
been sought. If the judge suppressed the evidence, the police would
be put in a position worse off than they would have been had they
U.S. at 813-14. No such reference is included in the portion of the majority opinion dealing
with the "fruits of the poisonous tree" issue.
134. For a discussion of the "no worse off" principle and Williams !!, see infra note
156.
135. See supra note 128 for application of the inevitable discovery doctrine after Williams if for instances in which no lawful line of investigation is underway at the time of the
discovery of the evidence through illegal means. At one point in the Williams 11 opinion, the
Court stated that "[ilnevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on
demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.
... 467 U.S. at
444 n.5. It is not inconceivable that the Court, relying on this note, could someday require that
in order to take advantage of the inevitable discovery doctrine, the prosecution must demonstrate a lawful investigation already in progress. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 486 A.2d
729, 735-36 (D.C. 1985)) (interpreting the above quoted footnote).
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not proceeded illegally. Such a decision, therefore, could be seen as
conflicting with the rationale of the Williams II opinion. Under a
strict reading of the Williams II decision, such warrantless search
situations would almost always fall within the bounds of the inevitable discovery doctrine.
In those situations in which the police are able to demonstrate
the existence of some probable cause, they can persuasively argue
that had they used legal methods (sought a search warrant) they
inevitably would have discovered the evidence.' 3 6 The Court's hold-

ing in Segura, which rejects the defense argument that the evidence
could have been moved or altered in the time it took to get a war-

rant, makes successful use of the inevitable discovery doctrine in illegal warrantless search situations even more likely.' 37 Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that an application of the inevitable discovery
doctrine, which requires only a showing of likelihood of discovery,
would largely remove any incentive for police officers to obtain

warrants.
V.

Applications of the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine

The open ended approach taken by the Supreme Court in Williams II has understandably led to non-uniform application of the
inevitable discovery doctrine by different jurisdictions. 13 8 For exam136. See United States v. Whitehorn, No. 86-5524 slip op. at
- (4th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 745-46 (Ist Cir. 1986); United States v. Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624,
631-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Krukoff v. State, 702 P.2d 664, 666 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985);
State v. Butler, 676 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo. 1984).
137. Segura, 468 U.S. at 814-15.
138. United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985) (lawful investigation
already ongoing when evidence illegally obtained); Bonuchi v. Wyrick, No. 83-0877, slip op. at
(W.D. Mo. Jul. 18, 1985) (doctrine applied although no lawful investigation in progress);
United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11 th Cir. 1984) (requiring that lawful means
of discovery were possessed and were being pursued prior to illegal obtaining of evidence);
Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137, 1139 n.6 (D.C. 1985) (requiring commencement of lawful process prior to illegal discovery of evidence); United States v. Lewis, 486 A.2d
729, 736 (D.C. 1985) (interpreting Williams II as requiring a showing of "inevitability" of
discovery different from the burden of proof by preponderance of evidence); State v. Holman,
109 Idaho 382, 392, 707 P.2d 493, 502-03 (1985) ("narrow" application of doctrine in Williams !! requiring investigation be in process); State v. Raj, 368 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (relying on multifactored approach including purpose and flagrancy of misconduct;
factors court viewed as surviving Williams 11); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 293-94, 709 P.2d
225, 242-43 (1985) (requiring that proper procedures "would have been utilized" and interpreting Williams II as not requiring that the lawful investigation be underway at the time of
the illegal discovery); State v. Washington, 120 Wis.2d 654, 358 N.W.2d 304, 310 (1984)
(appearing to rely on "no worse off" concept in applying doctrine).
With respect to using the doctrine to overcome the warrant requirement, some courts
after Williams !1 have refused to apply the doctrine. See People v. Young, 159 Cal. App. 3d
138, -_, 205 Cal. Rptr. 402, 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Schoondermark, 717 P.2d
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pie, the fear expressed by some commentators, and by judges in
some cases decided before Williams H, concerning the danger to the
warrant requirement of an unlimited inevitable discovery doctrine 3 9
has already been realized. In State v. Butler,4 0 after quoting at
length from Williams II and specifically noting the significance of
the "no worse off" principle and the absence of non-bad faith re-

quirement, the Supreme Court of Missouri allowed the prosecution
to overcome the warrant requirement by use of this doctrine. In that
case, the court ruled that although the police violated the defendant's Miranda rights in obtaining information concerning where in
the defendant's house evidence might be recovered and then seized
and searched the house without a warrant, it would be appropriate to
apply the inevitable discovery doctrine because the police could
504, 506 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 235-39, 495 A.2d 90, 103-04
(1985). Some courts have applied this doctrine without any restriction beyond the likelihood of
discovery. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehorn, No. 86-5524 slip op. at (4th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Moscatiello and Carter, 771 F.2d 589, 604 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted,
Murray and Carter v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987); United States v. Merriweather,
777 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1985); State v. Butler, 676 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo. 1984); State v.
Miller, 300 Or. 203, 293-94, 709 P.2d 225, 242-43 (1985). Other courts have applied the
doctrine but with additional restrictions. See United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (5th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204-06 (5th Cir. 1985); United States. v.
Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 845-47 (1985); United States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624, 63132 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137, 1139 n.6 (D.C. 1985).
139. In Griffin, the Court said:
The assertion by police (after an illegal entry and after finding evidence of
crime) that the discovery was 'inevitable' because they planned to get a search
warrant and had sent an officer on such a mission would, as a practical matter,
be beyond judicial review. Any other view would tend in actual practice to emasculate the search warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 956, 961 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 415 N.E.2d 818 (1981). The Benoit court's position was: "We decline to
apply the rule in a situation where its effect would be to read out of the Constitution the
requirement that the police follow certain protective procedures - in this case, the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 823; People v. Sciacca,
45 N.Y.2d 122, 129, 379 N.E.2d 1153, 1156, - N.Y.S.2d
-, - (1978) stating: "The
theory of inevitable discovery is essentially a safety valve for the exclusionary rule to be used
when the constitutional violation is of technical dimension and should not be used to countenance the breaking into a locked garage by administrative investigation." United States v.
Allandro, 634 F.2d 1182, 1185 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980), taking the position that: "[m]echanical
application [ofindependent source/inevitable discovery doctrine analysis] where a search warrant is subsequently commissioned . . . would allow police officers to treat the warrant requirement as merely an cx post facto formality." United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 6364 (2d Cir. 1981); 3 LAFAvE, supra note 19, at 624; LaCount & Girese, supra note 21, at 506
("[tihe unfettered use of 'inevitable discovery' would potentially void the necessity to ever
obtain a warrant because of the presence of the argument that the investigation would have
obtained a warrant and inevitably discovered the evidence."); Pitler, supra note 57, at 630
("[tihe exclusionary rule, designed to discourage illegal police activity, is useless if the police
may unlawfully invade a man's home, illegally seize evidence and then claim 'we would have
obtained it anyway.'"); Comment, supra note 67, at 158-59; Note, supra note 107, at 159;
Note, supra note 19 at 1054.
140. 676 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1984).
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demonstrate probable cause through other means and could have obtained a warrant which would have led to discovery of the evidence
4
inany event.1 1
In U.S. v. Levasseur,"4 2 a federal district court held that the
search of a footlocker was permissible because agents were in the
process of preparing an affidavit which would have led to a warrant
authorizing the search. Thus, the fact that the warrant requirement
was avoided in this case was not deemed to be fatal. In State v.
Miller,"13 the police learned of the whereabouts of a dead body from
the defendant after violating his Miranda rights in a manner similar
to the violation that occurred in Edwards v. Arizona.' Unlike Williams H, the body was located in the defendant's hotel room, an area
protected by the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. Concluding that the hotel maid would have found the body in 48 to 56 hours
in relatively the same condition in which it was actually discovered,
the court employed the inevitable discovery doctrine to excuse the
officer's failure to obtain a search warrant. 4
From the perspective of inflicting the most damage to the warrant requirement, the most dangerous use of the inevitable discovery
doctrine is its application to situations in which the evidence would
not have been discovered by legal means independent of the illegal
warrantless entry. Suppose that possessed with probable cause, the
police enter a house without bothering to obtain a search warrant.
Later they argue that had they sought a warrant they would have
obtained one and inevitably discovered the evidence in question. This
methodology requires, in essence, a judicial reconstruction of the police investigation incorporating the necessary legal prerequisite of obtaining a warrant."16 Understandably, prior to Williams II, some
courts were most reluctant to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine
in such a manner.1 47 For example, in Commonwealth v. Benoit,"48
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine "where its effect would be to read out of the
Constitution the requirement that the police followed certain protec141. Id. at 813.
142. 620 F. Supp. 624, 631-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
143. 300 Or. 203, 709 P.2d 225 (1985).
144. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
145. 300 Or. at 293-94, 709 P.2d at 242-43.
146. Appel, supra note 128, at 115.
147. See. e.g., United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir. 1974). See also
United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1981); Commonwealth v. Benoit,
382 Mass. 210,
, 415 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1981).
148. 382 Mass. 210, 415 N.E.2d 818 (1981).
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tive procedures - in this case the Warrant Requirement of the 4th
Amendment."' 9 'As stated previously, the "no worse off" principle
accepted by the Supreme Court in Williams H could serve as the
philosophical basis for just such a defacto elimination of the warrant
requirement.
In attempting to discern how the inevitable discovery doctrine
will be applied by courts in the post-Williams H world, it is instructive to look at warrant avoidance situations where the evidence could
not have been legally acquired without a search warrant. In U.S. v.
Satterfield, 50 a warrantless search of the defendant's house, subsequent to his arrest, turned up a gun that the prosecution wished to
introduce into evidence. After the discovery of the gun, the police
obtained a proper search warrant based on other information and
claimed the gun would have been discovered during a warrant-based
search had not the earlier warrantless search occurred.' 5' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit interpreted
Williams II as being silent on the requirements for application of the
inevitable discovery doctrine with the exception of the High Court's
using a preponderance of evidence as its burden of proof respecting
the likelihood of discovery. 5 2 Therefore, in addressing the requirements for application of the doctrine, the eleventh circuit fell back
on pre- Williams II cases decided by the circuit, specifically, the decision in United States v. Brookins.'"3 Brookins required that there be
a reasonable possibility of discovery and that the leads which supposedly would have led to the legitimate discovery of the evidence must
have been pursued prior to the illegal discovery. The Satterfield
court asserted that suppressing evidence acquired while such legal
procedures were in progress would put the police in a "worse off"
position than if no illegality had occurred and, therefore, would conflict with the holding in Williams P.154 Applying these requirements

to the search in Satterfield, the eleventh circuit refused to apply the
inevitable discovery doctrine because the government had initiated
its legal investigation after discovery of the evidence through illegal
means. The court explained that: "because a valid search warrant
nearly always can be obtained after the search has occurred, a contrary holding would practically destroy the requirement that a war149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at , 415 N.E.2d at 823.
743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 845.
Id. at 846-47.
614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1980).
743 F.2d at 846.
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rant for the search of a home be obtained before the search takes
place." 150
What the court in Satterfield omitted in its analysis is any explanation of how the "no worse off" concept could survive a refusal
to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine in situations when the police have not initiated the legal process prior to the improper discovery of the evidence. In this situation, but for the illegal warrantless
search, the evidence would ultimately have been uncovered in a
proper warrant-based search. Therefore, it would seem that by excluding the evidence the court is putting the government in a position worse off than they would have been had the government acted
legally.' 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a
recent interpretation of Williams H, noted that applying the exclusionary rule in just this type of warrant avoidance situation would in
' In
fact leave the police worse off than had they not acted illegally. 57
refusing to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine to the seizure of a
gun from any army barracks where the police had probable cause to
search but never made any attempt to obtain a search warrant, the
court refused to use the "no worse off" principle as a sine qua non in
deciding whether to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine:
While suppression in such a case may put the prosecution
in a worse position because of the police misconduct, a contrary
result would cause The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine to swallow
the rule by allowing evidence otherwise tainted to be admitted
merely because the police could have chosen to act differently
and obtain the evidence by legal means. When the police forego
legal means of investigation simply in order to obtain evidence
in violation of a suspect's constitutional rights, the need to deter
is paramount and requires application of the Exclusionary
Rule.5'
There is a clear tension between a mechanical application of the
155. Id.
156. The facts of Williams II leave the door open to requiring that the process that
would lead to the ultimate lawful discovery of the challenged evidence be in operation at the
time of the illegal discovery. See generally supra note 127. However, where the police can
demonstrate the likelihood that they would have undertaken in the future a lawful and successful investigation either through direct credible statement of their intention or through the fact
that such an investigation is their customary procedure, it would seem that suppressing such
evidence would indeed leave them "worse off." Thus the Brookins/Satterfield requirement of
an "investigation in progress" would seem to run counter to the thrust of the Williams II "no
worse off" rationale.
157. United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1985).
158. Id.at 1205.
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"no worse off" rule in applying the inevitable discovery doctrine and
the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule.1"9 The test applied by
both the fifth and eleventh circuits would permit use of the inevitable
discovery doctrine when police are in the process of obtaining a warrant at the time that an illegal warrantless entry occurred. 60 Because the Supreme Court has clearly held to be irrelevant any consideration of whether the police acted in bad faith, 6 ' it would seem
that when one police officer decides to enter a house without waiting
for his colleague whom he knows to be actively seeking a warrant,
the fifth and eleventh circuits would probably allow the fruits of that
entry into evidence.
An examination of the cases involving police officers who
avoided the warrant requirement in situations similar to those found
in Satterfield and Brookins reveals the way most courts view how
the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine will impact upon
the deterrent role of the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Griffin,"62
' a pre-Williams II case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit was confronted with a situation where an officer
entered an apartment without a search warrant after no one answered the door. While they were "securing" the apartment, the police spotted illegal drugs in plain view and seized them.'63 On appeal,
the government conceded that the initial entry was illegal but argued
that since another agent had been dispatched to procure a warrant
prior to the illegal entry, and since a warrant was in fact ultimately
obtained after the illegal entry without relying on what was seen
during the illegal entry, the evidence would have been inevitably discovered legally by the post-warrant search and, therefore, should be
admissible. 4 The sixth circuit refused to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine holding that:
The assertion by police (after an illegal entry and after

finding evidence of a crime) that the discovery was "Inevitable"
159. See generally People v. Young, 159 Cal. App. 3d 138, , 205 Cal. Rptr. 402,
410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Schoondermark, 717 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985);
State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 391-92, 707 P.2d 493, 502-03 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985); State
v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 235-39, 495 A.2d 90, 103-04, 104 n.3 (1985); People v. Knapp, 52
N.Y.2d 689, 698, 422 N.E.2d 531, 536, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (1981).
160. E.g., United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (1lth Cir. 1984); United
States v. Miller, 666 F.2d 991, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d
1037, 1042 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980).
161. Williams I!, 467 U.S. at 445.
162. 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974).
163. Id. at 960.
164. Id. at 960-61. This case was also decided before the Supreme Court's decision in
Segura. See supra note 118.
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because they had planned to get a search warrant and had sent
an officer on such a mission, would as a practical matter be beyond a judicial review. Any other view would tend in actual
practice to emasculate the search warrant requirement of the

Fourth Amendment. 6 '

6 the Federal District Court for the EastIn U.S. v. Levasseur,"'
ern District of New York faced a somewhat similar factual situation
to the one in Griffin. Specifically, Levasseur involved a situation in
which an officer, already properly in a house, opened a footlocker
while a second agent was in the progress of seeking a warrant to
search the house. 167 The court, in this post-Williams H decision,
adopted the standard enunciated by the fifth circuit in Satterfield
and required that the government show that the lawful means of discovery was in progress prior to the actual finding of the evidence.'6 8
In Levasseur, the second agent had apparently been in the process of drafting the affidavit for the warrant when the footlocker was
opened. The defendant argued that since the affidavit had not been
''executed," the police had not undertaken enough of an independent
proper investigation to trigger the inevitable discovery doctrine. The
court held that enough proper steps had been taken to "initiate an
avenue for obtaining the evidence," and, after finding Griffin to be
inapplicable, it applied the inevitable discovery doctrine.'6 9
Once the court determined there was a likelihood of discovery
by legal means, the conditions of Williams H had been met, and, at
most, once a court concludes additionally that an investigation is already in progress, any Williams-based inevitable discovery inquiry
should end there.170 It is, therefore, noteworthy that the Court in
Levasseur found significance in the fact that the search of the footlocker had been undertaken by the police officer in good faith (as
demonstrated by his searching only one item) although he incorrectly relied on the exigency exception to the warrant requirement.' 7 ' The finding of good faith on the part of the officer was significant to the court because it demonstrated that the officer had
made "no attempt to evade the warrant requirement."' 2 In other
words, the court considered and apparently placed some reliance on
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

502 F.2d at 961.
620 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
Id. at 628-31.
Id. at 631-32.
Id.
See supra notes 125-128, 135 and accompanying text.
620 F. Supp. at 632.
Id.
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the absence of bad faith on the part of the officer, a factor specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in Williams H. Thus, although
both the holding and the basis of the holding in Levasseur are different than Griffin, the decision in Levasseur actually reflects the same
inclination present in Griffin, but decidedly absent in Williams II, to
look to the price in lost deterrence of applying the inevitable discovery doctrine in individual cases. 173 Unsurprisingly, the Levasseur
court found little need to deter where the officer acted in good faith.
An understanding of how expansive the Court intends the inevitable discovery exception to become may soon be demonstrated when
the Court reviews United States v. Moscatiello. " In this case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a trial
court's decision in which the inevitable discovery doctrine was used
to overcome an improper warrantless search.
After properly searching the defendant's truck and garage, the
investigators in Moscatiello, without a warrant, entered a warehouse
used by the defendants. There they observed burlap-wrapped bales
that they believed to contain marijuana. The investigators then went
to a magistrate and presented him with the information learned from
the lawful searches of the truck and garage but not with what they
observed during the warrantless entry of the warehouse. A search
warrant for the warehouse was issued, and, eight hours after entry, a
full search of the warehouse was conducted uncovering other evi1 75
dence of criminal activity.
Assuming, arguendo, that the initial entry of the warehouse was
illegal, the first circuit considered the admissibility of both the marijuana observed during the entry and the evidence discovered only
after the warrant-based search. As to the latter evidence, the court
concluded that the Supreme Court's holding in Segura was "on all
fours" and, therefore, this evidence was admissible under the independent source exception.17 6 In considering the admissibility of the
marijuana bales, the court turned to Williams II, "a closely analogous situation." Because the only requirement for application of the
173. Other cases in which courts have looked to the price in lost deterrence of applying
the inevitable discovery exception without assessing the bad faith of the police include: United
States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. Raj, 368 N.W.2d 14, 16
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 80 Cal. App. 3d 665,
681-82, 145 Cal. Rptr. 795, 804-05 (1978). In Raj, the court viewed the need to assess the
purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct before applying the inevitable discovery exception as surviving Williams II.
174. 771 F.2d 589 (Ist Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987).
175. Id. at 595-96.
176. Id. at 603.
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inevitable discovery doctrine is the likelihood of discovery by lawful
means (as Williams II seems to hold), the court held that the near
certainty of discovering the marijuana during the warrant-based
search compelled its admission. This holds true, the court noted,
even though such a decision runs counter to the exclusionary rule's
"chief and perhaps sole rationale . . . to deter future violations of

the fourth amendment." 1 "
The Supreme Court's response to the holding in Moscatiello
should be most significant because, as the first circuit noted: "this is
as clear a case as can be imagined where the discovery of the contraband in plain view is totally irrelevant to the later securing of a warrant and the successful search that ensued.' 78 Therefore, suppressing the evidence in this case would most certainly leave the
police in a worse position than they would have been in had not the
illegal pre-warrant entry occurred. Thus, the Court will have to confront the question of whether the "no worse off" principle as enunciated in Williams II is absolute or whether concern about the price to
be paid in the lost deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule is a
factor to be considered when applying the inevitable discovery
exception.
The significance of the holding in Moscatiello may go beyond a
determination of the breadth of the inevitable discovery doctrine and
could signal the general approach of the Rehnquist Court to the exclusion of all illegally seized evidence. Should the court affirm the
first circuit and apply the "no worse off" principle without limitation, the vitality of the warrant clause of the fourth amendment will
be put in serious jeopardy by the ability of police to ignore the warrant requirement yet avoid exclusionary rule consequences. The
Court may choose to ameliorate this impact on the exclusionary rule
and the warrant clause by imposing limitations on the use of the
inevitable discovery exception in warrant avoidance situations. Such
limitations could include a requirement that a lawful warrant ultimately was obtained or that the decision not to obtain a timely warrant was not the result of police bad faith. However, even if such
limitations are imposed by the Court, the requirement that the police
obtain a warrant before entering a constitutionally protected area
would be significantly weakened by application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to warrant avoidance situations.
177.
178.

Id. at 603-04.
Id. at 604.
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VI.

Improving the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine

The mechanical application of the inevitable discovery doctrine
as espoused by the Supreme Court in Williams H is based on a com-

bination of faulty logic and an unpersuasive reliance upon previous
court decisions. 17 9 What is particularly disturbing about such an
open-ended, inevitable discovery doctrine is its potential, if not likely,
effect of diminishing significantly the deterrent impact of the exclu-

sionary rule. While a tension necessarily exists between the goals of
allowing a factfinder to consider all probative evidence and deterring
the police from engaging in illegal conduct to obtain that evidence

through use of the exclusionary rule, both goals can reasonably be
accommodated through a case-by-case balancing approach to the inevitable discovery doctrine. The use of such a balancing approach
would be consistent with the method the Supreme Court has repeatedly advocated for determining whether illegally obtained evidence

needs to be suppressed in order to satisfy interests behind the exclusionary rule. 180
The one requirement imposed by the Court in Williams H for
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that the prosecu-

tion must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
evidence in question would ultimately have been discovered through

legal means. Williams argued that such a low burden of proof was
inconsistent with the higher standard that the Court imposed in
United States v. Wade. 8 1 The Wade court required a showing by a
clear and convincing standard when the prosecution attempts to
demonstrate that an in-court identification is not the product of an
improper, uncounseled, pre-trial identification of a defendant.' 8 2
179. See supra notes 59-116 and accompanying text.
180. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (requiring a case-by-case assessment of whether reliance upon warrant by officer was "objectively reasonable" and whether
supporting affidavit was prepared in good faith before allowing evidence seized pursuant to
invalid search warrant); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (rejecting per se
analysis for application of attenuation doctrine to testimony of live witness in favor of assessing
intent of officer); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (requiring multifactored case-by-case
analysis for application of attenuation exception to confession derived from illegal arrest);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (in deciding whether Miranda holding should be
applied precisely to evidence derived from statement taken before Miranda decision rendered,
Court looked to good faith of police officer in assessing need to deter); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (requiring determination of whether evidence was derived by
"exploitation" of illegality). The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the Brown holding.
See also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980);
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
181. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5.
182. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967). McCormick defines "clear and
convincing" as evidence which is "highly probable." C. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 320
(1954). Wigmore defines "clear and convincing" as "a stronger persuasion than preponder-
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In rejecting comparison to the identification issues involved in
Wade, the Williams H Court noted the difficulty of determining
whether an in-court identification stemmed from the witness' observation of the defendant at the illegal pre-trial display or instead from
observing the defendant at the time of the crime. "By contrast, the
inevitable discovery doctrine involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification
or impeachment and does not require departure from the usual bur'
This statement by the
den of proof at suppression hearings." 183
Court is particularly perplexing since the inevitable discovery doc-

trine, by its very nature, calls upon a court to hypothesize or speculate about something that did not in fact occur."8 4 Perhaps the only
way in which to assess the Court's assertion that a decision to apply
the inevitable discovery doctrine involves no speculation is to examine the factors relevant to determining the likelihood of discovery.
Most courts and commentators would require for application of
the inevitable discovery doctrine that in one form or another the

prosecution must successfully answer two questions: 1) what specific
lawful methods would have been used to discover the evidence and

2) would the use of these particular methods likely have produced
the evidence in a relatively unaltered condition? 8 5 Although the fact
that the police may have used a specific means of investigation may
ance." J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (Student Textbook) § 447 at 446 (1935). Preponderance
has been defined as, "proof which leads the jury to find that the existence of the contested fact
is more probable than its non-existence." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule I, 115 at 71 and
explanatory comment to f 5 at 75 (American Law Institute 1942). While applications of these
standards of evidence to the facts of actual cases are likely to be less than precise, it is understood that the "clear and convincing" standard requires more than the "preponderance"
standard.
183. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444-45 n.5.
184. See United States v. Castellana, 488 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1974); Parker v. Estelle,
498 F.2d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 507-09, 300 N.E.2d
139, 146-147, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796-98 (1973) (Wachtler, J., concurring); Johnson, The
Return of the "Christian Burial Speech" Case, 32 EMORY L.J. 349, 365, 373 (1983); Note,
Criminal Law N.Y. Adopts the Inevitable Discovery Exception, Upholds The Validity of Warrantless Arrests and Searches - Strikes Down The Death Penalty Statute, 23 BUFFALO L.
REV. 275, 281 (1973-74) (requires forecasting of future); Comment, supra note 101, at 129-30
("In practice, the [inevitable discovery] exception requires a court to assess post hoc conjecture
by the prosecution, buttressed by police testimony as to what investigators would have done
and would have achieved. Such avowals are easily made, yet particularly difficult to rebut
persuasively.").
185. See United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11 th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Miller, 666 F.2d 991, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Lewis, 486 A.2d 729, 735-36
(D.C. 1985); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 293, 709 P.2d 225, 242 (1985); State v. Sugar, 100
N.J. 214, 265, 495 A.2d 90, 103 (1985); Pitler, supra note 57, at 491; Note, supra note 57, at
91-92; Comment, The Inevitable Discovery Exception in California: A Need for Clarification
of the Exclusionary Rule, 15 U.S.F. L. REV. 283, 288-89 (1980-81); Comment, supra note
101, at 127.
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be a "historical fact capable of ready verification," the likelihood of
actual discovery will only occasionally be so demonstrable and not
subject to speculation. 86 In Williams II itself, the ongoing search for
the girl's body was clearly demonstrated, but assessing the likelihood
of success of the search required speculation by the Court on the
following issues: 1) whether the area in which the girl's body was
found would have been searched; 2) whether the body would have
been seen off the side of the road in a culvert where it was found; 3)
whether the snow would have covered the body by the time it was
reached; and 4) whether time would have caused the body to change
so that certain evidence derived from it would not have been
available. 8 '
When the Court imposes a relatively low burden of proof upon
the prosecution regarding the likelihood of discovery, it comes closer
to requiring a showing that the evidence could have been discovered
as opposed to requiring that the evidence would have been discov-

ered.

88

A showing of the former does not break the causal chain

between the initial illegality and the ultimate discovery of the evi-

dence, " 9 and use of the inevitable discovery exception in such a situanalogy to the independent source doctrine
ation makes the Court's
1 90
particularly suspect.

186. Commenting on the hypothetical nature of the inevitable discovery doctrine, one
commentator wrote: "Judges have a great deal of leeway when they are speculating about the
answers to hypothetical questions." Johnson, supra note 184, at 364. See generally Comment,
supra note 101, at 129-30; 74 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 57, at 93; Pitler, supra note 57, at
505. See also cases cited supra note 170.
187. See Respondent's Brief at 32, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (Williams i).
See also Johnson, supra note 184, at 372-73 (commenting upon the likelihood of inevitable
discovery).
188. Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit - The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 307, 315-17 (1964); Comment, supra note 101,
at 128 n.74.
189. Maguire, supra note 174, at 315. Professor Maguire, in discussing the essential
requirements of the inevitable discovery doctrine, wrote:
The significance of the word "would" cannot be overemphasized. It is not
enough to show that the evidence "might" or "could" have been otherwise obtained. [To sever the causal connection between illegality and the finding of evidence] the Government must establish that it has not benefitted by the illegal
acts; a showing it might not have so benefitted is insufficient.
Id. at 315. See also Pitler, supra note 57, at 590 (danger of applying doctrine based on "might
have" discovered); Comment, supra note 96, at 128-29 (greater quantum of evidence should
be required where, as with inevitable discovery doctrine, application calls for speculation);
Note, supra note 107, at 152 (the closer discovery is to certainty, the less likely the Government is to benefit from its illegal behavior); Johnson, supra note 84, at 365 (higher burden of
proof may be justified "given the presumed temptation to resolve doubtful hypothetical questions in favor of admitting evidence").
190. In a case decided after Williams i,the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the
Williams II "preponderance of the evidence" standard in favor of a "clear and convincing"
evidence requirement. State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 265-66, 495 A.2d 90, 103-04 (1985). The
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The closer the likelihood of discovering the evidence approaches
actual "inevitability," the more the inevitable discovery exception resembles the independent source rule and therefore should be applied
in a manner similar to that of the independent source rule. Take, for
example, a defendant who is arrested on the street, then subjected to

an immediate interrogation which violates his Miranda rights. During this interrogation, he admits that he has a glassine envelope of
heroin in his pants pocket which he then proceeds to hand to the
police. In such a situation, the police can readily demonstrate that
they would have properly discovered the heroin pursuant to a search
of the defendant's pocket incident to their arrest. 191 Given the near
certainty of the ultimate discovery of the evidence through legal
means had the illegal questioning not occurred, the inevitable discovery exception should be applied in a manner similar to the independent source doctrine without great concern for whether the police
illegality was purposeful or flagrant. As the likelihood of discovery
diminishes there is a correspondingly greater chance that the police
will benefit from their illegal conduct.' 9 2 In such situations, a variety
of factors which impact upon the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule should come into play before a determination is made that
the inevitable discovery exception should be applied.

Perhaps foremost among those factors are the purposefulness
and the flagrance of the police illegality. As the Supreme Court has
made clear on numerous occasions, it is particularly in those situations in which the police act with knowledge that their activity is
illegal that the need to deter through suppression of evidence is most

acute. 19 The suppression of evidence in such situations, it is hoped,
will deter not only the officer involved in the illegality, but more imNew Jersey court required a higher standard because it was the State that "created a situation
in which it is impossible to be certain what would have happened if no illegal conduct had
occurred." Id. at 103. Given this and the fact that the State is in total control of the information needed to overcome its violation of the law through the inevitable discovery doctrine, the
court imposed a higher burden of proof on the State regarding the likelihood of discovery. Id.
191. Searches incident to arrest have been explicitly sanctioned by the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645 (1983); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 224 (1973).
192. The reason for this is that evidence which would never have been obtainable will
now be available for use against the defendant due entirely to the commission of an illegal act
by the government.
193. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. 268, 279-80 (1978); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 485-89 n. 35 (1976); Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). Commenting upon the purposefulness and flagrance factors, one observer wrote "[where the officer recognizes that a search is
clearly illegal, the special deterrence effect should not be diluted, since the officer also should
recognize that the fruit of the search will be excluded .
Israel, supra note 107, at 141314.
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portantly, other officers who in the future would contemplate acting
in a similarly illegal manner. 19"4 The Court has described this forward-looking approach to the exclusionary rule by stating: "The
[Exclusionary] Rule is calculated to prevent not to repair. Its purpose is to deter . . . to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only effectively
available way . . . by removing the incen5
19
tive to disregard it."'

Errors of constitutional magnitude that are committed by police

officers who are aware of the illegal nature of their action (bad faith)
are the more appropriate targets for application of the exclusionary
rule for two reasons. The first of these reasons involves the need to
deter, and the second concerns the effectiveness of the exclusionary
rule as a deterrent.
There has for some time been debate about whether future unintentional police mistakes can be deterred through the use of the
exclusionary rule.

96

Proponents of a good faith exception to applica-

tion of the rule argue that one cannot deter someone from acting in
a manner which he is unaware is wrong at the time the action is
taken." 1 Opponents of a good faith exception respond that even an
objective good faith test puts a premium on ignorance and communicates the wrong message to police departments concerning how they
should train their new officers. 9' Regardless, it is seldom disputed
194. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976); See also Note, supra note 71,
at 1148-51; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the 4th Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 435
(1974); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search & Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665,
710-12 (1970).
195. 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Professor Amsterdam has compared the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule with the aim of putting an identification number on a television
set. Excluding evidence will not necessarily put fear in the mind of the officer contemplating an
illegal action any more than seeing an identification number will frighten a potential thief. The
value of the television and its attractiveness to the thief, however, will be diminished by the
identification number in much the same way it is hoped the value of evidence illegally obtained
will be reduced by the threat of the exclusionary rule. Amsterdam, supra note 194, at 431.
196. See infra notes 197-98.
197. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246
(1983) (White, J., concurring); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980); FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS, 26062 (1967); Israel, supra note 107, at 1413-14; see generally Wright, Must the Criminal Go
Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REV. 736 (1971-72); Comment, Is It Time For a
Change in the Exclusionary Rule?, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 161, 177 (1982).
198. See generally LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": U.S. v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. F. 895 (1984); Kamisar, Gates, "ProbableCause,"
"Good Faith" and Beyond, 69 IowA L. REV. 551 (1984); Beadley, "The Good Faith Exception" Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287 (1984-85); Bloom, U.S. v.
Leon and Its Ramifications, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 247 (1985). Additionally, some commentators have argued that a "good faith" exception would stifle the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Mertens and Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 371 (1981);
Comment, Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 117 (1984-85).
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that if the exclusionary rule does deter, it works best in discouraging
police officers who may be contemplating committing an act which
they know or believe to be illegal and, therefore, know they are risking suppression of the evidence if they so proceed. Therefore, the

effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent is likely to be far
greater when the police illegality involved is both knowing and
deliberate. 9 '
Furthermore, the need to deter is greater when the illegal activity of the police is deliberate. Society needs to make clear to the
enforcers of our laws that when they deliberately violate constitu-

tional principles a penalty must be paid.2"' Constitutional violations
committed by police officers are far more harmful to society when

done deliberately because such errors are in fact more egregious and
because they are perceived by society to be more egregious. The long
term success of our criminal justice system depends in no small part
upon the perception of that system.
In according no relevance to the bad faith of a police officer in
determining whether the inevitable discovery doctrine should be applied, the Supreme Court in Williams H rejected the approach taken
by both the Iowa Supreme Court 201 which affirmed Williams' conviction and the eighth circuit which reversed it, 20 2 as well as numerous
other courts and commentators. 203 The Court's failure to consider
the bad faith of the officer is particularly disturbing when coupled
with its requirement that the prosecution need only show the evi199. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S.
268, 279-80 (1978); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458-59 n. 35 (1976); Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
531, 537-39 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 351-52 (1974); Pitler,
supra note 57, at 597; Note, supra note 57, at 99-100.
200. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Note, supra
note 57, at 597; Israel, supra note 107, at 1413-14; Note, supra note 71, at 1138. With respect
specifically to the relationship between the need to deter intentional police misconduct and the
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, see United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196,
1204; United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 65 (2d Cir. 1981); People v. Sciacca, 45
N.Y.2d 122, 128-29, 379 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (1978); Comment, supra note 67, at 142-43;
Note, supra note 57, at 99-100.
201. See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 258-60 (Iowa 1979).
202. See Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1169-72 (8th Cir. 1983).
203. See United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 64-65 (2nd Cir. 1981); United
States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Carsello, 578 F.2d
199, 204 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584-85 (Ind. Cir. 1970).
See also People v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 80 Cal. App.3d 665, 680-83, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 795, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); People v. Sciacca, 45 N.Y.2d 122, 128-29, 379 N.E.2d
1153, 1156, 408 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25-26 (1978); 3 LAFAvE, supra note 19, at 624; Comment,
supra note 65, at 160; Comment, supra note 171, at 303; Note, supra note 56, at 100; Note,
supra note 101, at 159; Note, supra note 69, at 1148-49. See generally Comment, supra note
78 at 768-69.
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dence more likely than not would have been discovered. The combination of these two factors permits a police officer to deliberately and
flagrantly violate a constitutional requirement secure in the knowledge that he need only show that there is a slightly better than even
chance that the evidence would ultimately have been discovered
through legal means had he chosen to use them. In such a situation,
both the need to deter and the likelihood of actually achieving deterrence in the future through suppression of the evidence is at its
greatest.
Another factor largely ignored by both the majority and the dis4
senting opinions in Williams H is the nature of the right violated. 0
Only the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens examines in depth the
significance of Detective Leaming's violation of William's right to
counsel under the sixth amendment. Justice Stevens concludes that
the use of the "Christian Burial Speech" "was nothing less than an
attempt to substitute an ex parte, inquisitorial process for the clash
of adversaries commanded by the constitution." 20 5 The evil of such a
process is that it is completely inconsistent with the notion of what is
required for a fair trial. However, if the trial process is not tainted
by the Williams statement or any information which flowed from it,
the trial process has not been interfered with, and no suppression
need result from the sixth amendment violation. As the prosecution
must show that the evidence likely would have been uncovered even
without the illegally obtained statement, the trial process, according
to Justice Stevens, will not be tainted by admitting evidence derived
from the Powers girl's body.20 6 With no taint in the adversary process, there is no sixth amendment violation and no need to suppress.
Justice Stevens asserts further that since the process has not been
affected there is no need to assess whether Detective Leaming acted
in bad faith once it is determined that discovery of the body would
likely have ensued in any event. 07
Justice Stevens' criticism of the majority for ignoring the nature
of the right violated before applying the inevitable discovery doctrine
is warranted. The Supreme Court has recently made clear that
courts should try to establish a test for determining whether a consti204. The majority opinion deals with the nature of the sixth amendment right violated
only in response to the defendant's claim that a violation of the sixth amendment should not
require a balancing of competing values before suppressing evidence. Williams 1I, 467 U.S. at
446-47. The dissent does not discuss the nature of the right violated at all. Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 457 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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tutional violation has occurred and, if so, tailor a remedy both to the
wrong committed and protection of the interests that lie behind mak-

ing the conduct unlawful.2"8 Accordingly, when police having probable cause but no search warrant search a house and seize evidence

therefrom, it is wrong to limit consideration of whether the inevitable discovery doctrine should be applied to just the likelihood of discovery had a warrant in fact been obtained. A court considering in-

evitable discovery application in such a situation should place great
weight upon the purpose of the warrant clause of the fourth amendment and the reason for excluding evidence obtained in violation of
this constitutional principle.2"9 The Constitution requires that a warrant be obtained so that a magistrate, independent of the police, is
interposed between the individual and the forces of law enforcement. 1 ' It is this independent magistrate who, absent exceptional
circumstances, must make the determination of probable cause
before the police intrude upon fundamental privacy interests. Admitting evidence because of the fact that it likely would have been discovered had the police taken the time to comply with the warrant

clause strikes directly at the purposes behind the warrant requirement.2 1 In order to deter the police from routinely avoiding the war208. In United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981), the Court declared that a dismissal of the case was not an appropriate remedy for an alleged sixth amendment violation
stemming from attempts by DEA officials to get the defendant to change counsel. Id. at 363.
The approach advocated by the Court in Morrison was to "identify and then neutralize the
taint by tailoring relief appropriate to the circumstances to assure the defendant the effective
assistance of counsel and a fair trial." Id. at 365.
209. The Court itself has recently placed great weight upon these factors when it decided that evidence obtained pursuant to an invalid search warrant should be admissible if
seized by an officer acting in reasonable good faith. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984). Further, the Court considered the factors when it abandoned the "Aguillar-Spinelli
test" for determining what constitutes probable cause and required appellate courts reviewing
the sufficiency of affidavits to give "great deference" to the issuing magistrate's determination.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1984).
210. 12 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 151 (2d ed. 1978); RINGEL, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, p. 5-2 (1980). The Supreme Court has written:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in
making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity
and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (footnotes omitted). See also United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 ( ).
211. United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (1 Ith Cir. 1984); People v. Young, 159 Cal. App. 3d 138, 205 Cal. Rptr. 402, 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Knapp, 422 N.E.2d 531, 536, 52
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rant requirement (especially given the relative ease of demonstrating
the likelihood of both obtaining a warrant when probable cause exists and finding the evidence in the same condition), 2 the inevitable
discovery exception should not be applied to such warrant avoidance
situations.
Even though Justice Stevens appropriately looks to the nature of
the right to counsel as defined in Massiah and later cases,21 3 he is
wrong to conclude that such an examination automatically requires
application of the inevitable discovery exception in Williams II once
the prosecution demonstrates it was more likely than not that the
body would have been discovered absent the illegality. In addition to
examining the nature of the right involved, Justice Stevens should
have additionally required examination of how application of the inevitable discovery doctrine might weaken the deterrent impact of the
exclusionary rule and, therefore, encourage violations of the right to
counsel. 214 Justice Stevens acknowledged that the inevitable discovery doctrine must not be applied in such a manner but found that
the burden on the prosecution to demonstrate the likelihood of discovery would remove such an incentive by forcing the police to face
the risk of suppression.2" 5
As previously stated, the risk of suppression in many instances
may well be worth taking on the part of the police21 6 and, if it is, the
disincentive to violate the right to counsel is largely removed. Moreover, once it was conceded by Justice Stevens that it is necessary to
examine the police incentive to violate the constitutional principle in
question,21 7 the intent of the officer who violates the law would seem
to be a highly material consideration. That a police officer knows his
actions to be violative of the right to counsel and still chooses to act
in order to uncover evidence suggests there is a real need to insure
that similar violations of this fundamental right by police in the future be avoided. Since the purpose of the right to counsel, unlike the
N.Y.2d 689, 698, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (1981); State v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 625, 629
(N.D. 1981); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 238, 415 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1981);
United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1981).
212. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387 (1977).
214. In United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1047 (5th Cir. 1980), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declared that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule in sixth amendment cases was to deter the police from infringing upon the right to
counsel.
215. 467 U.S. at 456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring).
216. See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
217. 467 U.S. at 456 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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warrant requirement, is to protect the fairness of the trial, if the
state can demonstrate the near certainty of discovering the evidence
eventually through lawful means, the evidence should be admissible.
However, admitting evidence based upon a showing of a mere likelihood of eventual discovery when the evidence actually is discovered
through a deliberate violation of the right to counsel does not adequately protect so fundamental a right from future encroachment.
VII.

Conclusion

The doctrine of inevitable discovery can play a constructive role
in ameliorating the sometimes unduly harsh impact of the exclusionary rule. In applying the doctrine, however, care should be taken to
ensure that important constitutional rights protected by the exclusionary rule are not diluted. The approach taken by the Supreme
Court in Williams II regarding the inevitable discovery doctrine is
likely to result in just such a dilution.
By expressly permitting the government to use the doctrine to
overcome police illegalities committed deliberately and flagrantly,
the Court does real damage to important constitutional principles
such as the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment and the
exclusionary rule as a a means of protecting those principles. In selecting the lowest conceivable burden of proof for a factual determination that is necessarily hypothetical and frequently speculative in
nature, the Court facilitates the process whereby these principles are
weakened.
The doctrine of inevitable discovery can largely achieve the purpose envisioned by its proponents without paying such a heavy price
in lost constitutional protections. Before applying the doctrine, courts
should consider the nature of the right violated, the purposes behind
application of the exclusionary rule in the context of that right, and
the likelihood of actual discovery through a subsequent lawful

means.
As the degree of likelihood of discovery by subsequent lawful
means increases toward near certainty, the closer the case is to one
where an application of the independent source rule would be appropriate. In such cases, as with those applying the independent source
rule, the exclusionary rule approaches "inapplicability," and, therefore, such cases warrant little consideration of exclusionary rule con-

cerns, namely, the bad faith of the police. As the degree of likelihood
of discovery by lawful means diminishes toward the "preponderance" level, the exclusionary rule is more clearly applicable, and ap-
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plication of the inevitable discovery doctrine is more aptly described
as an overcoming or satisfaction of the rule. In such situations, as
with the application of the attenuation doctrine, those factors that
impact upon the purposes behind the exclusionary rule need to be
considered. As the primary purpose of the rule is to deter police misconduct, an assessment of the purposefulness and flagrance of the
police action is most relevant when the likelihood of lawful discovery
is not overwhelming.
Additionally, when the very purpose of the constitutional right
violated would be defeated by application of the doctrine of inevitable discovery, even the near certainty of subsequent discovery should
not result in the admissibility of the challenged evidence. Such a
right is contained in the warrant clause of the fourth amendment.
Use of the inevitable discovery doctrine to overcome searches of constitutionally protected areas undertaken without search warrants
would undermine the constitutionally-mandated procedure of obtaining a warrant before such searches take place. By incorporating
these considerations into a determination whether to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine, the Supreme Court can properly balance
the competing interests of admitting probative evidence while not diluting our most important constitutional protections.

